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Abstract 
 
The automotive and automotive components industry has long formed the backbone of manufacturing 
in the Eastern Cape. Supported by the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) since 1995, 
the sector has been a major source of industrial growth and employment creation in the province. In 
contrast, the province’s non-automotive manufacturing (NAM) firms, the vast majority of which were 
attracted to the area by generous apartheid-era incentive schemes in the 1970s and 1980s, are 
struggling to maintain output and employment in the absence of government support. Since the 
withdrawal of incentives in 1992, non-automotive subsectors have experienced a contraction in output 
and employment, few new entrants, little innovation, and a substantial amount of firm closures.  
This thesis aims to identify the current constraints facing non-automotive manufacturing firms in the 
Eastern Cape. Its findings are based on interviews conducted in September and October 2013. 25 
firms and 7 key industry representatives were interviewed in the metros and surrounding industrial 
areas of East London and Port Elizabeth. Interviews were structured loosely around a questionnaire 
that focused on eight identified constraining factors. The interview process was conversational, aimed 
at engaging in a meaningful dialogue with firms and industry representatives. 
The secondary aim of this thesis is to utilise the information obtained through firm interviews to 
provide possible targeted policy solutions to address the constraints facing non-automotive 
manufacturing subsectors in the Eastern Cape. In light of the Eastern Cape Provincial Industrial 
Development Strategy’s (PIDS) scheduled revision in 2015, this thesis makes the case for (1) placing 
a larger emphasis on regionally and sectorally specific industry policies within the new PIDS; and (2) 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
The Eastern Cape (EC) has a history rich in industrial activity. It’s origins lie in the province’s vast 
agricultural resources. Dating back to the early 19th Century, the Eastern Cape’s agricultural base 
developed around the production of animals and animal products, the cultivation of pine forests, and 
the introduction of fruits and teas to the region. Forward linkages to industrial activity in the metros 
followed—the processing of citrus, pineapples, mohair, wool, and timber provided the foundation for 
industrial development.  
 
The region’s access to two ports facilitated the growth of the automotive and automotive components 
industry—currently the largest manufacturing subsector in the EC. The origin of the auto industry 
dates back to 1924 with the opening of the first Model T assembly plant in Port Elizabeth. The 
following decades saw the establishment of General Motors, Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, and Ford 
assembly plants in Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, East London, Struandale, respectively. In 1995, the 
introduction of the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) provided the government 
support necessary to sustain investment growth in the subsector, which translated into substantial 
growth in output, exports, and employment.  
 
The auto industry has since served as the backbone of EC manufacturing. The sector currently 
accounts for 25.2% of the EC manufacturing employment and 30.7% of the province’s gross value 
added (GVA) (Global Insight, 2013).1  While the automotive sector has grown, largely due to the 
support of protective measures and incentives provided by the MIDP, non-automotive manufacturing 
(NAM) has experienced a steady decline—marked by a decrease in GVA, loss of employment, 
contraction or exit of established firms, and limited entrants into non-automotive subsectors.  
 
The non-automotive and non-agro-industry subsectors in the EC grew as a result of apartheid-era 
policies designed to attract labour-intensive industries to areas bordering the former Transkei and 
Ciskei homelands. The escalation of incentive packages offered to manufacturing firms in the 1970s 
and 1980s spurred a wave of industrial activity in the EC, reaching its height in the late eighties. 
However, once the generous incentives that attracted firms to the region were withdrawn over a two-
year period from 1991-1993, non-automotive manufacturing in the EC suffered severely.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These figures underestimate the dominance of the auto subsector as they do not include the production of 
goods and services that feed into the auto industry supply chain, but are classified under other subsectors e.g. 
tires are classified under “Petroleum products, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics.” 
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While the state has actively supported the automotive industry, NAM has remained largely 
unsupported. As a result, EC industry is highly dependent on the performance of the automotive 
sector with the vast majority of activity concentrated in the two municipalities—Nelson Mandela Bay 
(Port Elizabeth) and Buffalo City (East London).  
 
The 2008/2009 financial crisis caused a contraction in global demand. New domestic vehicle sales 
and vehicle exports from South Africa dropped by 30% and 22%, respectively, from March 2008 to 
March 2009 (ECDC 2009: 36). The EC’s dependence on the automotive industry made it particularly 
susceptible to the downturn in consumer demand, both foreign and domestic. Furthermore, nearly two 
decades of declining activity in the non-auto manufacturing base provided little buffer from 
exogenous shocks to the economy.  
 
At present, The EC is home to 12.8% of the national population—6.7 million people. The region is 
marked by high inequality, poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. In 2012, the EC GDP per 
capita was R26, 000, just over half of South Africa’s GDP per capita, R48,000. From 1996 - 2012, the 
EC growth rate has fairly consistently fallen below the national GDP growth rate. The average rate of 
growth for the period 1996 – 2012 for the EC was 2.7 percent—0.5 percent lower than the national 
average of 3.2 percent. Furthermore, 2013 employment data indicates that, when compared to national 
indictors, the EC suffers from a higher unemployment rate (30.8 percent compared to the national 
average of 24.7 percent), a lower labour force participation rate (45.2 percent compared to the 
national average of 55.7 percent).  
 
The impact of the recession on the EC economy brought to light (1) the glaring structural and spatial 
weaknesses of the region’s economy; (2) the major unemployment problem in the province, which has 
been exacerbated by the rapid decline of the decentralised nodes, and 3) the necessity for public sector 
participation in creating policy solutions to support the diversification and development of NAM in 
the province.  
 
Investigating these provincial weaknesses and possible regional industrial policy solutions is the focus 
of this thesis.  
 
1.2 Research Aims 
 
The general objective of this study is twofold. It aims to identify and analyse the factors currently 
constraining the non-automotive manufacturing sector in the Eastern Cape. This thesis also aims to 
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provide possible targeted interventions to halt the process of deindustrialisation and promote the 




To undertake this analysis, this dissertation drew upon: 
 
Secondary data in the form of (a) published and unpublished literature detailing the historical 
processes that shaped the current structure of the EC economy with particular emphasis on the 
repercussions of the state’s evolving decentralisation policies; and (b) quantitative data sourced from a 
number of databases to illustrate the changes that have taken place in the EC economy and the current 
state of the economy in comparison with national economic indicators.  
 
Primary data collected from interviews with NAM firms in the metros and surrounding areas of East 
London (EL) and Port Elizabeth (PE). Interviews were also conducted with key representatives from 
provincial government, associated government agencies, industry associations, and relevant labour 
unions. These interviews were undertaken as part of a study undertaken for the National Treasury 
under the project leadership of Professors David Kaplan and Mike Morris.  
 
1.3.1 Secondary Data  
 
Quantitative data was sourced from multiple databases—Statistics South Africa, Quantec, and Global 
Insight Southern Africa—as well as from Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council’s 
(ECSECC) ongoing research surrounding manufacturing in the province. The data is utilised in 
Section 3.3 to first give an overview of the EC’s economic performance in comparison to national 
performance indicators over a span of 15 years. The section then uses quantitative data to illustrate the 
changes that have occurred specifically in manufacturing and manufacturing subsectors over the past 
15 years with regard to changes in the sectoral and spatial composition of manufacturing activities.  
 
Limitations of the Data 
 
The data utilised to give an overarching illustration of the EC’s performance—gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth, development indicators, sectoral contributions to GDP, etc—was consistent across 
datasets, providing a coherent picture of general economic patterns that have occurred in the province 
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since 1996. However, when looking specifically at the EC’s manufacturing sector, the following 
problems were encountered: 
 
1. In order to assess the performance of the NAM sector, I had to disaggregate the non-auto 
subsectors from the transport manufacturing subsectors. When output from transportation 
manufacturing is subtracted from total manufacturing output in the EC, the result is a higher 
output than would be expected given the consensus (built prior to this study by multiple 
government agencies through previous studies, firm interviews, and factory visits) that EC 
non-automotive manufacturing has been on the decline since the early nineties.  
 
The most probable explanation for the discrepancy between the story illustrated through the 
data and that of the opinions of qualified individuals on the ground is the relationship between 
non-automotive and automotive industries in the EC. Many NAM firms feed into the supply 
chain, directly or indirectly, of automotive production (i.e. foundries, textile, metals, and 
plastics firms, etc), but are not classified within the transport manufacturing subsector. These 
firms often benefit from government support to the automotive sector, either directly as 
suppliers into the chain or indirectly through the positive effects of the sustained growth of 
the sector since the MIDP was enacted in 1995.  
 
Since the data available does not differentiate between non-automotive manufacturers that 
participate in the automotive industry and those that do not (those firms that are the focus of 
this study), it can be expected that these “non-auto,” yet “auto related” firms provide a boost 
to the performance indicators for the entire non-auto subsector. Given the limitations of the 
data, it is assumed in Section 3.3 that if the both auto and “auto related” manufacturing firms 
are deducted from total manufacturing output in the EC the performance of the NAM 
subsector would be much lower than the data suggests.  
 
2. Finding reliable data for employment is essential for this study. One of the primary concerns 
surrounding the decline of NAM in the EC is the fact that the subsectors that have suffered 
the most (i.e. clothing and textiles and electrical machinery) are the most labour intensive 
subsectors, resulting in massive job-shedding. That said, finding consistent manufacturing 
employment data for the EC was a challenge. 
 
Manufacturing employment data from multiple sources was compared. However, each 
database measures employment by different specifications, methodology, and sample sizes, 
rendering it impossible to verify the accuracy of the data. The Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
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(QLFS) and the Quarterly Employment Survey (QES) on StatsSA therefore proved 
problematic for the purposes of this study. 
 
• QLFS measures informal and formal employment from household surveys. There are 
two main issues with this method. First, the survey is subject to sampling errors due 
to inaccurate or incomplete reporting on behalf of the respondent. Second, due to the 
fact that the survey measures both formal and informal employment, there is a 
tendency for the employment estimations to be higher than if data is collected directly 
from manufacturing firms. QLFS manufacturing data for the EC, disaggregated by 
subsector, from the year 1996-2011 can be found in Appendix A.  
• QES gathers information on employment from the firms themselves and classified by 
sector. This data, however, often underestimates the number of employed because it 
omits employees that are not included in the firm’s payroll. While this dataset would 
be the preferred source for employment data—due to both the focus on formal 
employment and the reliability of the source (i.e. firm payroll data as opposed to 
households)—StatsSA does not provide data by region, nor by manufacturing 
subsector.  
 
Due to the limitations of these official datasets, advice was sought from the ECSECC 
economic research department. ECSECC’s work surrounding manufacturing in province 
utilises employment data from Global Insight’s Regional eXplorer (ReX) database, which 
derives its content from a variety of sources. The database applies national and sub-national 
verification tests to ensure that the data is consistent. For Section 3.3, the same Global Insight 
dataset was used, provided by ECSECC, to give as accurate a depiction as possible of state of 
manufacturing employment in the EC over the past 15 years. The Global Insight data was 
compared to the data obtained from the QLFS (Appendix A) in order to verify the accuracy of 
the data. While the employment numbers provided by QLFS were higher than the data 
provided by Global Insight, they showed similar trends in declining employment in particular 
subsectors, the analysis of which is outlined in Section 3.3.   
 
1.3.2 Primary Data 
 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the qualitative and quantitative primary data collected during 
two trips to EL and PE in September and October of 2013. Interviews were conducted with 25 
manufacturing firms, as well as representatives from 7 key organisations, in the metros and 
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surrounding areas of EL and PE in September and October 2013 (for a full list of interviewees see 
Appendix B).  
 
In all cases, interviews with firms were with senior management – for privately owned firms this 
coincided with ownership. Interviews were conducted with the primary aim of identifying the current 
constraints obstructing firm growth and gathering interviewee opinions on possible policy solutions to 
those constraints.  
 
Firm Selection  
 
The firms that were selected for interviews were drawn from particular subsectors. The aim was to 
avoid interviewing firms that fed into the automotive and automotive components sector, however, 
there was some overlap (though not significant), especially within the metals, metal products, 
machinery, and equipment subsector. The subsectors were selected based on the following criteria: 
 
1. The current proportion of total employment in the non-automotive sectors;  
2. A trend of increasing employment share since 1995; 
3. Relative possibilities for raising employment levels. 
 
According to these criteria the following subsectors were selected: 
 
• Food, beverages and tobacco – 18% of employment, increase of 34% 
• Metals, metal products, machinery and equipment – 16% of employment, increase of 37% in 
employment  
• Textiles, clothing and leather goods – 8.5% of employment, suffered severe drop of 43% 
since 1995, but has substantial labour absorbing capacity.2 
 
There were 10 firms interviewed that did not fall into these categories—for the purpose of this study 
they are classified as “other.” These firms are involved in construction, light manufacturing, 
electronics, and plastics subsectors and were selected due to similarities with the three subsectors (e.g. 
they exhibit the potential for labour absorbing capacity, they are subject to the same nationally 
bargained wage rates as the metals subsector, etc).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Employment data are from Quantec as per the SLA 
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Interviewed firms were also selected with the aim of achieving an equal distribution between firms 
based in EL and PE, as well as a relatively equal distribution between subsectors. The selection 
process and selected firm characteristics are detailed further in Section 4.2.1 
Research	  Design	  
 
Each interview lasted roughly 60-90 minutes and was structured to gather both quantitative and 
qualitative data from the interviewee. The vast majority of time was spent gathering qualitative data 
through a personal conversation with either a small group or single representative from senior 
management of the firm (this often coincided with ownership for privately owned firms).  
 
Conversations were loosely based on a questionnaire outlined prior to the interviews. The 
questionnaire (Appendix C) is separated into multiple sections. The first section deals with identifying 
basic characteristics of the firm—location, age, size, output, subsector, etc. The following section asks 
the interviewee to give a brief history of the company, with emphasis on the firm’s performance 
(growth or contraction in employment, investment, output, etc.) over the past 5-10 years. The next 
section then asks more detailed questions surrounding eight constraint categories—labour costs, 
labour productivity, shortage of skills, transport costs, electricity costs, local competition, competition 
from imports, and lack of government support. These categories were selected based on previous 
literature surrounding the challenges facing manufacturing firms both in the EC specifically, and 
South Africa as whole, providing a broad enough spectrum to allow the firms to voice concerns 
covering a variety of topics.  
 
It is important to note that the “constraints to growth” methodology has both its strengths and 
weakness. By selecting eight exogenous factors for the firms to reflect upon, the structure provided 
necessary focus for the time-constrained interviews. These factors also held the most relevance for a 
discussion surrounding potential industrial policy solutions, with the ultimate hope of creating an 
enabling economic environment to spur growth in output and employment. However, the framework 
does so at the expense of a meaningful discussion of the endogenous factors that may have a 
significant impact on firm performance—e.g. systems of management or organisation of production. 
Although falling outside the scope of this study, exploring endogenous factors restricting firm growth 
in the EC is an important topic for future research.  
 
After an in depth discussion surrounding the eight constraint categories, the interviewees were then 
asked to rank each of these constraints on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being an unimportant factor and 10 
being a very important factor in constraining the company’s growth. The previous line of questioning 
allowed for deeper reflection on the magnitude of the constraints facing the companies. In asking the 
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firms to rank the constraints after this discussion, the hope was that the quantitative data gathered 
from the interviews would provide a more accurate reflection of the current realities facing the firm 
than if quantitative data had been collected prior to the discussion. Analysis of the data collected is 
utilised throughout Chapter 4 and disaggregated by firm location, subsector, and size, providing a 
complimentary illustration of the patterns discovered through the qualitative component of the 
questionnaire.  
 
The questionnaire ends with a final section focused on prospective policy solutions to address the 
constraining factors. Some questions were tailored at specific policy suggestions (e.g. a youth wage 
subsidy, a regional procurement policy), while other questions were open ended, allowing 
interviewees to offer their own opinions on possible actions government can take to enhance their 
performance.  
 
Throughout the interviewing process, the questionnaire was used as a guiding tool in order to provide 
structure and coherency to the data collected. It was not used as a strict set of survey questions to limit 
or restrict the responses of the interviewees. Interviews were conversational and informal in nature, as 
opposed to following a formal “question and answer” formula. Questions were tailored to each 
individual firm, allowing each respondent to expand on issues that they felt were important, as well as 
bring up issues that were not covered in the questionnaire. The decision to allow for flexibility and 
freedom in the interview process was a conscious one. The technique made it possible to capture a 
more nuanced narrative of each firm’s experience, paying heed to the complexities of the issues at 
hand. Furthermore, the strategy limited the ability of any preconceived notions held by the interviewer 
from influencing the interviewee’s responses and, thus, restricting both the quality and the range of 
information gathered from the interview.  
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the historical background, the focus of the thesis, the research aims, as well as 
a detailed overview of the research methodology and its limitations.  
 
Chapter 2: Situating the Study  
This chapter provides a literature review of industrial policy theory, detailing the evolution of the 
definition of industrial policy, the connection between industrialisation and development, and the 
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main arguments for and against state intervention. Additionally, it provides the theoretical framework 
within which policy suggestions presented in this thesis may be situated.  
 
Chapter 3: Background on Eastern Cape Industrial Development 
This chapter consists of three main sections. The first details the historical background of EC 
industrial development, following the three separate development trajectories of the urban centres, 
rural areas, and former decentralisation nodes. The second outlines the evolution and impact of EC 
regional industrial policies post-1994. The third provides a detailed quantitative analysis of both past 
trends and the current state of the EC economy, with a specific focus on the EC manufacturing sector.  
 
Chapter 4: Interview Summary: Identified Constraints and Suggested Policy Proposals 
This chapter presents the information gathered from the interview process. It provides a detailed 
description of the constraining factors identified by the interviewees, as well as an analysis of those 
constraints by subsector, firm size, and geographical location. The chapter ends with a summary of 
the programmes and policies proposed by the interviewees themselves.  
 
Chapter 5: Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
This chapter provides summaries of the key constraints identified in Chapter 4, as well as policy 
suggestions to alleviate those constraints. It concludes with final remarks regarding the relevance of 
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Chapter 2: Situating the Study 
 
2.1 Industrial Policy Theory 
As detailed in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to identify the current constraints facing non-
automotive subsectors in the EC with the goal of providing a foundation of information from which 
industrial policy solutions can be formed to address the challenges facing these ailing industries. The 
ultimate hope is that government intervention and support can reverse the trend of deindustrialisation 
in the province, catalyzing growth of output, employment, and new entrants within NAM. In order to 
provide an analytic context, this chapter will address some of the key issues in the literature concerned 
with industrial policy. 
 
2.1.1 The Evolving Definition of Industrial Policy 
 
The vast research surrounding industrial policy is built upon varying definitions of the term itself. 
Furthermore, the term is used to frame discussions surrounding an even wider variety of issues, 
including but not limited to: industrialisation, globalisation, internationalisation of finance, 
innovation, technological change, foreign investment, institutional arrangements, trade policy, labour 
relations, industrial networks, and capability upgrading. The application of industrial policy theory to 
a vast number of thematic issues raises a number of questions about the differing definitions of 
industrial policy and what this ambiguity means for both the theoretical conclusions and policy 
implications drawn from this growing body of research.  
 
Discussions around industrial policy tend to fall into two categories—single-issue industrial policy or 
an all-embracing industrial policy. Single-issue industrial policy is centred around one issue, often 
trade policy (i.e. export oriented regimes or import substitution regimes) or innovation policy 
(supporting technological change and enhancing capabilities). Literature that focuses on all-embracing 
industrial policy tends to hold that all economic policies contribute, directly or indirectly, to 
promoting industrial development and should therefore be encompassed within term.  
 
For Chang (1994), the all-embracing definition of industrial policy is problematic.  The definition is 
often too inclusive, it “overloads the concept,” at the expense of providing meaning to the analysis of 
specific policies applied to promoting specific industrial sectors or capabilities (Chang 1994: 59; see 
also Corden 1980, World Bank 1994 and 1993). In order to overcome the limitations of viewing 
industrial policy through the lens of single-issue or as all-embracing, Chang offers an alternative 
definition for selective industrial policy—“a policy aimed at particular industries (and firms as their 
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components), to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as 
a whole” (Chang 1994: 60).  
 
Chang’s model of industrial policy materialised in response to his analysis of the South Korea’s 
successful use of selective state interventions to promote specific industries and firms. His analysis 
provided a much need explanation for the “Asian Miracle,” an explanation that the World Bank stance 
on industrial policy at the time—limited to general measures to upgrade human and physical 
endowments and limit market failures—failed to provide. Chang (1994) uses to the South Korean case 
to identify conditions for successful industrial policy. These conditions are rooted in the viewpoint 
that industrial policies should be (a) selective in terms of choosing to promote specific industries, 
technologies, markets, and products; (b) flexible enough to adapt to changing conditions and failures; 
(c) oriented toward specific social and economic goals; (d) incentivised to reward firms and industries 
are efficient and punish those that are not.  
 
Chang’s most significant contribution to the literature is the centrality of capacity building within his 
model of industrial policy. As a necessary element of industrial development, the upgrading of a 
country’s capabilities becomes both a goal of industrial policy and a subsequent positive input into 
both the policy-making and policy implementation process. This virtuous cycle is what Chang (1996, 
1999) terms a “learning-by-doing” process, a main counterpoint to the orthodox argument that 
developing countries with little technological, managerial, and institutional capacities are incapable of 
implementing selective industrial policies well and should, therefore, abstain from doing so at all.  
 
The main argument against Chang’s model is his abstraction of policy-making from the socio-
political, socio-economic context of the one developing country. He assumes that the state has the 
ability make autonomous decisions insulated from the influence of both the private sector and public 
interest groups. 
 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 236), recognising this weakness, build their definition of industrial policy 
from a foundation of first identifying the “underlying economic and political relations upon which the 
form of industrialisation will depend.” While acknowledging that all economic policies—those 
effecting interest rates, exchange rates, labour relations, etc.—impact industry, they maintain Chang’s 
argument that industrial policy should be viewed as selective interventions in order to achieve specific 
goals. However, they argue that any analysis of industrial policy must (1) situate itself within the 
wider domestic and international socio-political context; and (2) acknowledge the vast number of 
conflicting interests that exist within those contexts. Policies are not simply the output of state 
decision-making processes. They are the result of a process of complex negotiation amongst multiple 
stakeholders both within and without the state.  Fine and Rustomjee’s model rests on the assertion that 
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industrial policy should “not be generally defined,” but rather should understood as a reflection of the 
underlying socio-political-economic framework and the role that industry plays within that framework 
(1996: 236).  
 
Dani Rodrik’s work surrounding industrial policy in the 21st Century built upon the literature of the 
nineties, which was written largely in response to the emergence of the Asian Tigers. Applying earlier 
industrial policy theory to a new era, Rodrik (2004) reconstructs the model to fit an emerging 
international consensus, one that looks beyond the debate over too much or too little government 
interference in developing countries to a more pragmatic understanding of the state’s role in industrial 
transformation. Rodrik argues that “developing societies need to embed private initiatives in a 
framework of public action that encourages restructuring, diversification, and technological 
dynamism beyond what market forces on their own would generate” (Rodrik 2004: 1). These policies, 
he hesitantly calls “industrial policies,” pointing out that what is defined as an “industrial policy” 
often impacts, and is often targeted toward, non-industrial activities in the agricultural and service 
subsectors.  
 
Rodrik greatest contribution to the evolving definition of industrial policy is his perception of 
industrial policy not as specific interventions aimed at achieving specific outcomes, but as a dynamic 
process. Industrial policy as a process is defined as a “strategic collaboration between the private 
sector and government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles to 
restructuring lie and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them” (Rodrik 2004: 2). It is 
an open dialogue between the public and private sector through which both sides learn from each 
other and participate in the process of discovering solutions.  
 
Rodrik’s description of industrial policy as a “process of economic self-discovery in the broader 
sense”  (2004: 38)—a process of learning that requires the active involvement of both the private and 
public sector—forms the theoretical foundation for this study. The first step toward creating viable 
policy solutions is to initiate a conversation with the private sector. Through extensive, in-depth 
dialogue with key representatives from the private sector, this thesis aims to learn first-hand about the 
constraints facing NAM firms in the EC. The hope is that this conversation will evolve into a 
partnership between the private and public sector—to establish an environment that fosters well-
informed policymaking and “self discovery.”  
2.1.2 Industrialisation and Development   
 
Before exploring the debate surrounding what form industrial policies should take in a developing 
country and how they should be implemented, it is necessary pay heed to the question of why the 
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process of industrialisation is a key component of economic development. More specifically, why is 
the pursuit of manufacturing growth important for the development of the EC?  
 
The answer to this question is often grounded in historical precedent. Historically, societies that 
experienced economic transformation and growth followed a similar trajectory—from participating in 
largely agrarian activities to industrial activities. Growth in manufacturing had positively reinforcing 
effects, resulting in increased innovation, the adoption of new technologies, and, ultimately, higher 
productivity.   
 
In the modern era, the traditional trajectory has changed—the road to industrial development is more 
complex, however, the arguments in favour of manufacturing-led development have not lost their 
relevance. Heterodox scholars (the debate between orthodox and heterodox economists is summarised 
in the following section) argue the manufacturing is still an essential agent of economic 
transformation due to characteristics specific to the sector (Amsden 2001, Kaldor 1967, Page 2011, 
Verdoorn 1980, Weiss 1985). 
 
Weiss (1985, 2003) summarises the arguments in favour of viewing manufacturing growth, as 
opposed to growth in the agricultural or service sectors, as central to structural transformation in 
modern developing economies:   
 
• Positive externalities: manufacturing activities generate positive externalities through the 
acquisition of new technologies, knowledge, and skills, which are then transferred to other 
firms, subsectors, and sectors. This process translates into expanded innovative and 
technological capacities from which the economy as a whole benefits, increasing productive 
capacity, quality of goods produced, and income levels.  
• Linkages: manufacturing activities require large supply chain networks. The quantity and 
level of interdependence of firms within these networks provides channels for faster 
dissemination of new technologies and skills, thus, increasing the multiplicative effects of 
positive externalities. 
• Productivity growth: Increased productivity per worker in the manufacturing sectors 
translates to cheaper capital and goods, both as outputs and intermediate inputs, for 
consumers and producers alike. This begets higher real income levels, greater investment, and 
increases in demand.  
• Labour absorption: unlike agriculture and service sectors, increases in productivity in the 
manufacturing sector do not necessarily correlate with a decrease in labour employed. 
Improvements in production and increases in output often lead to increased investment and 
expansion, generating more opportunities for labour absorption.   
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While the above characteristics illustrate the manufacturing sector’s vital role in accelerating 
technological change and economic growth, it must be noted that industrial policy, as defined by 
Rodrik, should not be limited to manufacturing sectors, especially in an African context (Kaplan 
2008). Development in agricultural and service sectors can play an essential role in economic 
restructuring. In a South African context, the potential growth in linkages between agriculture and 
industry present numerous opportunities for expansion of productivity capacity and employment 
growth. This potential is of particular importance to the EC, a region with a long history of agro-
industrial activity and untapped agricultural potential in the former Transkei and Ciskei homelands.  
 
2.1.3 Rationale for Industrial Policy 
 
As detailed in the previous section, it is widely acknowledged that manufacturing is a key driver of 
economic growth and development. This general consensus naturally leads to the question of what 
action should be taken in order to support the growth of industry in developing countries. The debate 
over how much or how little state intervention should or should not be exercised is one that is 
exhaustively discussed in the industrial policy literature. For the purpose of this thesis, it is 
unnecessary to detail every argument and counterargument surrounding the debate over the extent or 
appropriateness of state involvement in industrial development.  However, this section will give a 
general overview of the arguments posed by those against (or in favour of strict limitations on) the use 
of industrial policy (orthodox, free market economists) and those in favour of industrial policy 
(heterodox economists from various specialisations). 
 
Before I outline the arguments on either side of industrial policy theory, it is important to note that 
presenting the debate as a dichotomy between state-led and market-led industrialisation (as it is often 
presented in industrial policy literature) is misleading. By organising the following section according 
to orthodox and heterodox arguments for the sake of simplicity and concision, I do not mean to reduce 
the debate to a black-and-white issue. To do so, comes at the expense of a meaningful dialogue about 
how the state should respond to the reality of market imperfections and market failures in the context 
of complex socio-political settings. Discussions surrounding industrial policy in the 21st Century have 
evolved to a point where, as Rodrik (2007: 2) states, “It’s not about whether, but about how.” 
Orthodox Arguments 
 
Orthodox and free market economists, as well as those aligned with the Austrian school of economic 
thought, draw their arguments against the adoption of industrial policy from three strains of economic 
theory: 
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1. The neo-liberal model minimizes the significance of linkage formation in development and, 
therefore, sees little need for supporting the coordination of activities. Instead, policy should 
be focused on creating an environment in which the market can operate efficiently, which 
will, in turn, allow for the formation of linkages between individual firms to occur organically 
as a result of decisions made according to comparative advantage (Bayoumi, Coe and 
Helpman 1996; Lal 1983; Lucas 1990 and 1988; Krueger 1998 and 1990; Little and Mirrless 
1997; Tirole 1997).  
2. The orthodox trade model asserts that individual firms and industries attain higher 
productivity levels through specialisation according to comparative advantage. If a market is 
running efficiently, these comparative advantages will be made known through price 
signalling. Free trade of capital and goods will accelerate the process of specialisation and, 
subsequently, higher productivity and economic growth (Balass 1990; Krueger 1974; Lal 
1983). 
3. The Austrian school of economic thought maintains that economic growth is driven by 
“creative entrepreneurs” operating in a dynamic market economy. These individual agents, 
operating independently, each with their own unique fragments of knowledge and skill, have 
the ability to achieve greater results than top-down coordinated action aimed toward a specific 
goal (i.e. state-led industrial policy) (Hayek 1949,1978).  
 
These theoretical arguments build the basis of the orthodox stance against industrial policy. Free from 
exogenous distortions, price signalling will reflect a nation’s factor endowments. Independent agents 
will make rational decisions according to price signals, producing goods and services according to 
their comparative advantage. The mobility of goods and capital through free trade agreements will 
accelerate a country’s trajectory towards a steady state of economy growth. This entire process occurs 
without state coordination or support. Moreover, state involvement may actually obstruct market 
forces and misallocate resources away from activities aligned with the country’s comparative 
advantages, leading to inefficiencies and hindering growth. State intervention, necessary only in 
response to market imperfections, should be implemented with the goal of achieving outcomes that 
market forces would have realised if not subjected to exogenous distortions. 
  
Orthodox theory has been revised and revisited by economists from a variety of perspectives, 
including new-growth and new-institutional economics (Krugman 1995, Krugman and Smith 1994, 
Stiglitz 1998 and 1996). Their contributions to the literature have adopted many of the orthodox 
opinions on state intervention, specifically with regard to targeted and selective industrial policies 
(narrow industrial policy). However, they concede that state intervention is necessary to create an 
environment in which market forces can operate efficiently to achieve a steady state of economic 
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growth. This requires broad, general industrial policy—provision of infrastructure, development of 
human capital, creating a neutral business environment, facilitating the flow of information, and 
limiting transaction costs.  
 
However, the implementation of even broad-based industrial polices requires state competency in 
formulating and implementing large-scale public policy. One of the main arguments against the use of 
industrial policy is the fact that even if state intervention has the potential to positively impact the 
economic structure of a developing country, the state’s inability to enact the policy —due to lack of 
skill, lack of information, rent seeking, predatory behaviour, etc.— will leave the economy in a worse 
state than if left to free-market devices (Krueger 1974 and 1990, Lal 1983). 
 
This point is relevant to the South African context, where the lack of skilled public workers place 
limitations on the extent to which policies can be implemented. While this is certainly a national 
problem, it is especially relevant within the context of the EC and is a central issue within the scope of 
this study. As detailed below the lack of qualified individuals available to fill open positions in the 
EC’s public institutions presents a great limitation to the extent of their success in both policymaking 
and implementation.  
 
The most obvious answer to this predicament is to simply build public sector capacities. Proponents 
of industrial policy argue that the lack of state capabilities should not be used as a justification for 
neglecting industrial policy, but, rather, should stand as an argument in its favour. Low skill levels in 
the public sector are generally a reflection of the larger issue of low levels of education and training 
affecting the country as a whole (Fine 1997). Chang’s (1996, 1998) “learning-by-doing” theory is just 
as applicable to the acquisitions of skills in the public sector as it is in the private sector.  In order to 




The heterodox arguments in favour of industry policy emanate from a diverse and vast number of 
sources. Many contributions to the literature emanate from context-specific empirical studies, adding 
credence to the argument that market imperfections in developing countries are pervasive and require 
public action (Banerjee and Duflo 2005; Foster and Rozensweig 1995; Ferme 1996; Goldstein 2001; 
Morduch 1999; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2003; Shaban 1987; Sutton 2005). This section will focus on 
the theoretical arguments for industrial policy, as the empirical case for state intervention is 
inconclusive—providing as many examples for industrial policy successes as industrial policy 
failures.  
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I will draw mainly from Rodrik’s model of industrial policy as a process of “self-discovery” (as 
described in Section 2.1.1). Orthodox theory maintains that specialisation according to comparative 
advantage is key to the process of industrialisation. In contrast, heterodox theory contends that 
structural transformation of the economy is necessary for developing countries to move away from 
traditional sectors towards new products and industries. Diversification is hailed as the key toward 
economic growth, not specialisation (Imbs and Romain Wacziarg 2003, Klinger and Lederman 2004). 
 
For developing countries to alter the structure of their economy, they must master a variety of 
activities. Yet, the process of breaking into non-traditional sectors is a risky undertaking. The 
existence of information and coordination externalities deters potential entrepreneurs from investing 
in new activities and results in low levels of innovation. The following description of these 
externalities offers a counterargument to orthodox theory, illustrating the existence of market failures, 
the negative impact of these failures on industrial growth, and possible policy solutions to provide 
incentive for diversification.  
 
1. Information externalities: The process of discovering what new activities will prove profitable 
in a developing economy requires the adaptation of new technologies and new methods of 
production. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003: 18) detail how foreign technologies are often not 
easily transferrable to different environments, requiring the innovative firm to undergo a 
process of “considerable domestic tinkering.” Once a new technology has been adapted to local 
conditions, this technology can be easily transferred to other firms who freely gain from higher 
productivity levels, while the innovative firm bears all of the cost (Dube et al., 2007). By 
investing in a new technology, a firm may either (a) fail to adapt it to the local environment; or 
(b) succeed without benefiting from the comparative advantage due to an influx of new 
entrants. The assessment of this risk will prevent firms from choosing to innovate, and, thus, 
inhibit the process of “self-discovery.”  
 
Policy Implications: The reality of information externalities is especially relevant in the contest 
of the EC, a province that suffers from very few new entrants and little evidence of innovation 
from established firms.3 Public policy is necessary to reduce the risk of investing in new 
technologies and entering into new product markets. This can be accomplished through either 
ex post or ex ante subsidisation of non-tradition industrial activities. Rodrik (2007) suggests a 
“carrot and stick” method, through which firms are encouraged to innovate through subsidies, 
trade protection, or government provision of start-up capital (the carrot). These interventions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interviews with CEO of ELIDZ, the EL and PE Chambers of Commerce, and CEO of ECSECC.  
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should be accompanied by predetermined performance requirements, close monitoring and 
evaluation, and withdrawal of incentives in the instance of failure (the stick).  
 
2. Coordination externalities: Entrance into new industries or production of new products, often 
requires large investment; the simultaneous upgrading of infrastructure, skills, and technology; 
and the guaranteed availability of all necessary inputs. If left to market devices, it is less likely 
that the elements necessary for a non-traditional activity to succeed will align at just the right 
time.  
 
Policy Implications:  State intervention can be viewed as a way to solve these coordination 
problems. Coordinating action can be implemented on both a large and small scale. Large-scale 
coordination efforts may take the form of direct coordination of activities by the government, 
or through implicit bailouts or investment guarantees by the state. Macro-coordination efforts 
may also take the form of publicised national goals and long-term visions for the future, 
providing “a focal point, or consensus, around which decisions can be coordinated” (Chang 
1994: 65). Small-scale coordination efforts may involve the formation of clusters around 
specific sectors or locations, through which collective decision making, knowledge-transfers, 
and coordination of inputs can be facilitated.  
 
The existence of market failures in the form of information and coordination externalities provides the 
theoretical rationale for industrial policy and invalidates many orthodox arguments. Yet, the most 
fundamental argument against the orthodox view of industrial policy is a simple, but important one—
the orthodox model is a simply a construct. It fails to reflect the reality that the “market” and the 
“state” are not isolated, autonomous entities. They are embedded in, and a reflection of, an intricate 
and dynamic socio-political economic environment that is specific to both time and place (Amsden 
1997 and 1993, Cramer 1999, Chang 1994, Fine 1997, Fine and Rustomjee 1996, Gore 1996, 
Hirschman 1958 and 1981, Khan 1995). The orthodox model is simply not a useful tool when 
confronted with the realities of the imperfections, conflicts, and compromises inherent in a 
development context.  
 
2.1.4 Theoretical Structure and State Action  
 
While Rodrik’s description of industrial policy a “process self-discovery,” forms the theoretical 
foundation for this thesis, Lall and Tuebal’s (1998) categorisation of different types of industrial 
policies provides the theoretical structure. In response to a study analysing the role in which 
technology policy played in the Asian Miracle, Lall and Tuebal identify three types of industrial 
policies: 
	   26	  
 
1. Functional policy: Policies to improve market efficiency (e.g. lowering of tariffs); 
2. Horizontal policy: Policies applied generally across sectors (e.g. incentives to promote greater 
research and development); 
3. Selective policy:  Policies that support the growth of a particular sector or firm (e.g. the 
promotion of “national champions” in Malaysia).  
 
While South Africa incorporates all three of these types of policies into its industrial policy 
framework, selective industrial policies that tailor specific programmes to promote specific industrial 
activities are utilised to a lesser extent. The two exceptions are the clothing and textiles subsector and 
the automotive and automotive components subsector. Exporters within these subsectors receive 
rebates on imported inputs proportional the amount of final products exported.  
 
This thesis, by focusing on a specific sector in a very specific region, will call for selective industrial 
policy solutions to address the constraints unique to the NAM firms in the EC. That said, many of the 
constraints detailed in Chapter 4 are not limited to the region—they are national problems that require 
national attention and horizontal policymaking (e.g. inefficiencies in the SETAs, rigidity within 
central wage bargaining systems). Therefore, Chapter 5 will provide both selective and horizontal 
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Chapter 3: Background on Eastern Cape Industrial Development 
 
3.1 History of Economic Development in the Eastern Cape 
 
The EC’s current industrial constraints are largely a result of uneven sectoral and spatial development 
arising from apartheid era policies.  Decades of active deindustrialisation of some areas and targeted 
industrialisation of others through policies of facilitating homeland decentralisation have had lasting 
effects on the promotion of uniform, equitable, and sustainable development in the province.   
 
The development of the EC can be categorised into three distinct development trajectories:  
(1) Rural areas, including the former Transkei and Ciskei homelands;  
(2) The two industrial centres, EL and PE; and  
(3) The decentralisation nodes in the Border region.  
Policy Implication: Current policy initiatives should be wary of ignoring the specific dynamics 
underlying these distinct trajectories. 
3.1.1 Rural Areas and Homelands  
 
Commercial farming in the rural areas, supported by government subsidies and protective tariffs, was 
limited to the west side of the province, largely in the Cacadu and Chris Hani districts. Agriculture in 
the homelands was (and continues to be) widely underdeveloped and restricted by communal land 
tenure systems, heavily dominated by small-scale subsistence farming. In terms of inter provincial 
comparisons this is reflected in the fact that the EC has the second highest number of households 
dependent on subsistence agriculture. 
 
Under apartheid, the EC homelands were effectively a reserve labour pool for the mining industry. 
Both the Ciskei and the Transkei were identified as priority areas for mining recruitment. This 
resulted in:   
 
• A heavy dependence on remittances from outside the province;  
• Extreme underdevelopment of productive capacities; and  
• Minimal investment in infrastructure.  
The vast majority of rural household livelihoods are sustained by subsistence farming, which is 
supplemented by remittances, pensions and welfare grants. The historical decline of the mining sector, 
and the consequent increased job shedding over the past couple of decades, has displaced 
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unemployment into these areas, resulting in increasing reliance on government transfers to sustain 
household incomes. 
3.1.2 East London and Port Elizabeth 
 
The two metropoles, East London and Port Elizabeth, have a long history of manufacturing. After 
World War II, the EC experienced its first wave of industrial growth. Foreign automotive firms, 
attracted to South Africa due to high protective tariffs, began establishing auto assembly plants in EL 
and Uitenhage. The establishment of the automotive components industry quickly followed. EL and 
PE became centres of the growing South African automotive industry. 
 
Industrial activity was not limited to the automotive sector. Historically, EL and PE participated 
substantially in the agro-processing and clothing and textiles industries. However, since the 1980s, 
both cities have seen a substantial decline in both output and employment in historically strong non-
automotive sectors.  
 
EL and PE, only 300 km apart, share a similar industrial composition, but, historically, have never had 
strong economic ties. Apartheid policies effectively divided the east (Border) and west (Midlands) 
regions of the province, thus establishing two distinctive socioeconomic environments.  
 
Policy Implication: This has had substantial social and economic consequences and implications for 
current industrial policy: 
 
• The two cities formed much stronger relationships with their respective hinterlands than with 
each other.  
• Separate social and economic relationships continue to exist in the Midlands and Border, and 
shape their development trajectories. 
• At a policy level the existence of two separate socioeconomic environments have historically 
been ignored by blanket policies indiscriminately applied to the two metros and surrounding 
areas.  
3.1.3 Decentralisation Nodes 
 
The industrial decentralisation policy, in its many forms, was a key instrument of the apartheid 
regime. Although its motives and goals evolved in response to the changing economic and political 
climate, the policy essentially served the larger goals of separate development. The current state of the 
EC economy is very much a product of decades under the decentralisation policy.  
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The policy originated in the 1930s, but was only formalised into a cohesive policy in 1955 with the 
Tomlinson Commission Report, which proposed development of the Bantustans through the 
establishment of industrial nodes on the borders of the homelands. These nodes were intended to 
create jobs, absorb the masses of unemployed labourers, spread economic benefits to the Bantustans, 
and effectively curb black migration from the homelands to the urban areas.  
 
The government officially launched the Decentralisation Strategy in 1960. The original growth points 
were established within 50 km of the Bantustan borders, excluding the existing industrial centres of 
East London, King Williams Town, and Queenstown from the packaged incentives. Industrial activity 
in nodes like Dimbaza, Butterworth, Ezebellini was incentivized with the goal of both attracting new 
investments and relocating existing enterprises to the area.  
 
The impact of the initial incentives package was negligible. The incentives in place were not 
sufficient to compensate for the infrastructural and logistical challenges endemic to the border region 
and failed to attract industry. The failure prompted a revision of the policy in the late 1960s. In 1967, 
the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act was put in place to restrict the growth of 
industry in the metros. To further promote Bantustan development, the incentives package was 
improved - further tax breaks, the elimination of a minimum wage, and the barring of unions - and the 
scope of the policy was expanded to nodes within the homelands themselves.  
 
The areas granted access to decentralisation incentives expanded to such an extent that government 
realised it was impossible to financially support the infrastructure needs of the industrial nodes. In 
1971, the decentralisation policy shifted towards a growth points strategy. Fewer nodes (Butterworth 
and Mthatha were selected as growth points for the Transkei) meant the government could put in 
place more comprehensive financing and support structures. In reality, growth points were just added 
to the list of areas that were supported by government incentives. 
 
 The 1975 National Physical Development Plan incorporated all of the previously established 
development areas into development regions, intended to counterbalance the growth of the urban 
centres. Within these regions, distinct areas were identified and assigned different incentives 
packages. Those areas that were less attractive to investors, due to distance from major cities, access 
to transportation networks, labour productivity, and infrastructure backlogs, were given more 
generous incentives.  
 
The shift to a more differentiated policy did not produce the intended results. Only after the Regional 
Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) was introduced in 1982 was there a notable increase in 
industrial activity in the border regions, marking a second wave of economic growth in the EC. The 
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1990 Transkei Industry survey shows that 70% of the firms operating in the Transkei in 1990 were 
established under the revised RIDP incentives scheme (ECSECC 1999: 21).  
 
As in the 1970s, differentiated incentives packages were granted to different nodes. Preference was 
given to labour-intensive industries and those firms operating on the homeland periphery. Unlike 
previous packages, incentives were granted as direct payments based on scheduled labour as opposed 
to tax concessions, including both areas within the homelands and the neighbouring white industrial 
centres. In addition to the general incentives packages in place for designated points like Butterworth 
and Dimbaza (Table 1), industrial development nodes benefitted from low wages and banned union 
activity.  
 
Table 1: Incentive Package for Designated Growth Points 
Incentive Percentage Duration 
Transport Rebate 60% of market interest rate 7 years 
Scheduled Labour 80% of total wage bill 7 years 
Training Grant R110 per employee per month 7 years 
Interest/Rental Concession 60%  10 years 
Housing subsidy 60%  
Relocation Allowance Unspecified  
Price preference on tenders 10%   
Electricity Concession Unspecified  
Source: Manual on implementation of RIDP Incentives cited in ECSECC, 1999. 
 
Growth in industry in the Transkei/Ciskei and the border areas was significant, but short-lived. 
Beginning with the revised RIDP in 1991, government shifted away from state-led development to 
market-led growth strategies. The decentralisation policy was scaled back and 1982 incentives were 
withdrawn over a two-year period from 1991-1993. As a result of the withdrawal of incentives, paired 
with liberalisation and removal of protective tariffs, the number of firms operating in and around the 
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Table 2: Number of Firms in Decentralised Areas (1983-1993) 
Year Net of Number of New Firms Total 
1983 - 64 
1984 15 79 
1985 3 82 
1986 2 84 
1987 6 90 
1988 12 102 
1989 13 115 
1990 -8 107 
1991 -10 97 
1992 -15 82 
1993 -5 77 
Source: Transkei Industrial Survey 1990/1993, cited in ECSECC, 1999. 
 
 
The 1991 RIDP marked a decisive break from the past decentralisation policy. No longer emphasising 
separate sectoral or regional development, the strategy applied a revised incentives package across all 
areas outside of Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town without distinction. The scheme turned its 
focus from job creation to supporting the development of profitable firms with an emphasis on greater 
capital intensity and technological upgrading. Firms were granted access to incentives if they fulfilled 
the following criteria: (1) planned establishment of new factory (Establishment Grant) or planned 
expansion of existing factory (Expansion Grant); (2) engaged in the manufacturing sector; and (3) 
maintained an operating equity exceeding 35% of total assets (Office of the President 1993). 
 
After an assessment of the RIDP incentives scheme in 1996, the incentives were phased out over a 2-
year period, ending in 1998. The end of the decentralisation policy, a policy that had been in some 
form since the 1930s, had drastic effects on the former homeland and border regions within the EC. 
The industrial growth points that had been propped up by generous incentives schemes - Butterworth, 
Dimbaza, Berlin, King William’s Town, Queenstown, Ezibeleni, Mthatha - quickly fell into 
substantial decline when the incentives were withdrawn.  
 
The following summarises the effects of decentralisation policy on the EC: 
 
• There were few places left untouched from various expansions and revisions of the 
decentralisation policy over five decades. With each revision, new areas were designated as 
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“special” in some right, with varying degrees of incentives attached. This generated a 
pervasive dependence on state concessions throughout the province that was not limited to 
Transkei/Ciskei/Border, but extended to the historically ‘white’ industrial centres of EL and 
PE as well.  
 
• The policy’s primary goal was employment absorption for black workers in Transkei/Ciskei. 
Until the 1982 RIDP, the policy had the following results - between 1960-1980, an estimated 
150,000 - 200,000 jobs were created, substantial but still insufficient in comparison to the 
155,000 people who entered the job market each year (DBSA 1989, McCarthy 1983, Platzky 
1995). During the 1980s, the RIDP programme created 147,000 jobs in industrial growth 
points (Bell 1997). This growth was concentrated in the peripheral growth points, attracting 
low wage, labour intensive manufacturing firms previously located in the city centres.  
 
• Within the context of trade liberalisation, removal of tariff barriers, greater import 
penetration, increased union activity, rising minimum wages, and greater concentration of 
industrial development in the metros, the former industrial decentralisation points have 
struggled to survive without state support. Since the RIDP incentives were withdrawn in 
1996, many of the previously industrialised areas (Dimbaza, Butterworth) have collapsed and 
fallen into near total disrepair. Few studies have been completed which illustrate the extent to 
which these areas have experienced decline.  
Policy Implication: Industrial development directed at historically disadvantaged and previously 
decentralized areas, such as Dimbaza and Butterworth, would have to begin from a very low level. 
 
3.2 Current Policy Framework  
 
3.2.1 Post-1994 Industrial Policy 
 
After the transition to democracy in 1994, two major shifts occurred within national development 
policy that had direct implications for provincial economic development.  
 
First, the national government redefined South Africa’s development goals. Notions of development 
previously revolved around job creation, boosting industries with high labour absorption potential. 
After 1994, there was a shift towards thinking of development in terms of equality, welfare, and 
poverty.  
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The new government introduced three interrelated economic policies, which would determine the new 
trajectory for South African development: 
 
• Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 1994: intended to tackle the 
issues of economic decline, unemployment, and extreme inequality and poverty.  
• Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), 1996: addressed macro-economic 
reforms, including the reduction of the deficit, the shift to inflation targeting, the end 
of the financial rand, and the deregulation and privatization of finance and labour 
markets.   
• Micro-economic reforms: liberalisation of trade through the removal or reduction of 
trade barriers.  
 
Second, decision making shifted from a centralised system of control to one that emphasised local 
economic development (LED). Under the new constitution for the Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
local councils were mandated to promote economic development within their region. This was 
indicative of the larger shift toward democratisation and decentralisation of power within the entire 
political economic system.  
 
However, attempts to devolve responsibility to lower levels of government were constrained by a 
number of factors. After 1994, local, provincial, and national levels of government went through a 
major restructuring and consolidation period. In the EC, the provincial government was formed out of 
six separate administrations, each with distinct structures, capabilities, and strategies. In the period 
following 1994, provincial government’s focus was on restructuring and rationalisation of 
administrations, identifying provincial backlogs, and acquiring the necessary capacity to implement 
provincial policy.  
 
While development policy was intended to be decentralised and locally-led, this was severely 
hamstrung by a lack of policy formulation and implementation capacity at provincial levels. 
Moreover, there were serious shortcomings in communication between and within different levels of 
government. Consequently, in many provinces national departments were still left dictating provincial 
economic policy. This translated into a development policy with little ownership felt by provincial 
leaders and often little connection to actual provincial development needs and goals.  
 
Policy Implication: The resulting post-1994 policy consisted of very broad based goals that were not 
necessarily linked to EC provincial institutional capacities or provincial budgetary cycles, nor were 
	   34	  
there any monitoring or evaluation mechanisms in place to gauge policy implementation on the 
provincial level.  
 
3.2.2 National Development Initiatives of Direct Relevance to the Eastern Cape 
 
Manufacturing Development Programme  
 
After the incentives schemes of the 1991 RIDP were phased out in 1996, they were replaced with the 
Manufacturing Development Programme (MDP). The programme offered tax holidays to new 
industrial enterprises with a minimum asset base of R3m. New manufacturing plants could qualify for 
a 2-year tax holiday if they satisfied the following criteria:  
 
• They were located in one of many designated areas  
• They belonged to one of many designated industrial sub-sectors  
• They had a labour cost to value-added ratio above 55%.  
Manufacturing plants satisfying these criteria could qualify for the tax holiday for up to 6 years.  
 
Designated areas were selected if they served the following goals:  
• Reinforcement of secondary cities  
• Reinforcement of key urban nodes within a development corridor  
• Consolidation of merging agglomeration areas 
• Promote diversification of local economies.  
The goal of the MDP was to raise fixed capital investment in manufacturing, upgrade existing 
manufacturing processes, and reorient national manufacturing toward international markets, with the 
ultimate aim of increasing output and employment. Unlike the 1991 RIDP incentives, which were 
applied generally throughout the whole country, the MDP returned to emphasising specific areas or 
sectors. The programme represented a shift back to some of the principles of the 1982 RIDP, 
however, the tax holidays did not provide enough of an advantage for the programme to have a 
significant impact on attracting investment to declining regions.  
 
Spatial Development Initiatives 
 
Conceived of in coordination with the MDP in 1996, the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI) 
programme was funded with R400m from the RDP and was linked to GEAR. The goal of the 
programme was to promote investment in export oriented industrial enterprises, with an emphasis on 
generating growth in underdeveloped regions that were previously disadvantaged under apartheid.  
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Each project was intended to involve a short intensive intervention by the state, lasting only 12 - 18 
months, and then would be handed over to municipal or provincial levels of government. 11 SDIs 
were selected, two of which were within the EC—the Wild Coast SDI and the Fish River SDI (See 
Box 1)—each with a specific sector focus and anchor project linked to the perceived comparative 
advantage of the region.  
 
The programme was relatively successful in completing several key infrastructure projects. However, 
the programme relied on private sector partnerships to fund initiatives, which proved difficult to 
attract in the context of the Asian financial crisis. An evaluation of the programme in 2001/01 
concluded that the SDIs did not garner as much private investment as had been anticipated (Crush and 
Rogerson 2001; Platzky 2000). The projects were plagued by land ownership issues in former 
homelands; poor coordination between multiple departments and multiple levels of government; 
erratic monitoring and evaluation of the projects; high cost of investment relative to the number of 
jobs created; poor linkages from the anchor projects to the surrounding communities; and uneven 
levels of investment across the country (Bond 2002; Driver 1998; Fitschen 1998; Lewis and Bloch 
1998; Pretorius 2001; Taylor 2001; Walker 2001). The programme also suffered due to its design as a 
very short intervention by the government. The hope that local or provincial governments would take 
over projects after a period of 2 years turned out to be an unrealistic expectation - many projects, even 
successful ones, were cut off after the initial RDP funding ran out.  
Box 1: Fish River SDI 
 
The Fish River SDI was one of the eleven SDIs selected in 1996. The SDI was conceived as a 
development corridor running between EL and PE, but it immediately became clear that little 
investment would be attracted to the region between the two cities, so the SDI shifted its focus to 
promoting industry in the two metros. The SDI addressed five priority sectors—autos and automotive 
components; textiles, wool, and mohair; timber and wood products; and food processing—and 
contained two anchor projects, the Coega IDZ and the East London IDZ (ELIDZ). A nationally 
appointed project manager and technical team were tasked with identifying and packaging investment 
projects, which were then presented to potential investors with the hope of attracting the private sector 
involvement.  
 
The main emphasis of the Fish River SDI was to attract investment from outside of the region in order 
to maintain a sustainable growth path - to avoid creating short term, once off employment during the 
construction phase and then to have no long term job creation to show for the project.  The provincial 
trade promotion agency, the Centre for Investment and Marketing in the EC (CiMEC), focused on 
marketing PE and EL to international investors with the hopes of attracting export oriented 
manufacturing firms.  
 
In terms of implementation, the initiative failed on many levels. The Fish River SDI was a top-down, 
nationally led drive with little involvement from provincial/municipal stakeholders. Local levels of 
government treated the project with either confusion as to the nature of the SDI and their role in the 
project or complete indifference (Driver 1998). There was little communication and coordination 
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between the different levels of government, which resulted in (1) very little knowledge of the actual 
context within which these projects were taking place, and (2) very little ownership on behalf of the 
municipal and provincial teams that were tasked with running the projects after the national technical 
teams withdrew their support and funding.   
 
The SDI design was also flawed. Little benefit, apart from infrastructure improvements, accrued to 
people living in the corridor between EL and PE, the development of which was one of its main 
motivations. Furthermore, by viewing and marketing the Fish River SDI as one unit with urban nodes 
the project equated the two cities, when there was no logical reason to so. Each city has historically 
served different hinterland populations with its own distinct socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
The results of the Fish River SDI were thus disappointing (Driver 1998). Its main accomplishment 
was the construction of the Coega IDZ and ELIDZ.  
 
Industrial Development Zones  
 
The Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) were proposed in 1996 as a part of the SDI programme. 
Conceived as anchor projects in designated development corridors, the IDZs would be specially built 
zones linked to a port or airport that would attract external investment for export-oriented industries 
(DTI 2012). The programme was implemented in 2000 with four licensed zones—Coega, OR Tambo 
International Airport, East London, and Richards Bay.  
 
The zones were designed to offer the following incentives: world class infrastructure and utilities 
linked to an international port of entry; streamlined administration and custom controlled areas that 
would allow duty free entry of raw materials; tax holidays and access to government supply side 
programmes; and service areas for service and supply-side industries. However, many of these did not 
come to fruition and some incentives were available outside of the zones. The IDZs have yet to offer 
any meaningful concessions for transport, labour, or energy costs, which have become major 
obstacles in attracting foreign direct investment to South Africa.  
 
By 2012, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) had spent R6 billion on three operating zones 
in Coega, EL, and Richards Bay, all publicly owned and operated entities (Table 3). Between 2002 
and 2012, a total of 48,758 jobs were created, the vast majority under the initial construction phase. 
Only 5,169 direct long-term jobs have been created in the three operating IDZs. The most successful 
IDZs, Coega and ELIDZ, have been able to attract investment due to their proximity to the South 
African automotive industry. Most firms operating in these IDZs are in the auto components sector or 
serve the sector in some capacity.  
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Coega 20 R1,132m R4,365m 3778 37156 40934 
ELIDZ 21 R1,083m R1,395m 1179 6379 7558 
RBIDZ 1 R650m R331m 126 54 180 
Total  42 R2,864m R6,091m 5169 43589 48758 
Source: DTI 2013 
 
The programme has been heavily criticised and deemed unsuccessful by a number of measures (CDE 
2012; Chinguno 2009; DTI 2012; McCallum 2011; Nel et al. 2013). The original goal of the Fish 
River SDI, of which Coega and ELDIZ were considered two anchor projects, was to create 46,000 
permanent jobs (IDC 1997). Direct job creation in the two IDZs totalled 4957 in 2012. The majority 
of the firms located in the IDZs are capital intensive with limited potential for job creation and limited 
potential for backward linkages into the metros and communities surrounding the IDZs4.  
 
The IDZs were proposed in coordination with the SDI programme, which at its root was an initiative 
aimed at targeting specific regions that were underdeveloped, but had untapped potential for industrial 
growth. However, the goals of the two programmes were incongruent. The IDZs were set up as 
detached nodes from the two metropoles with little involvement from provincial or municipal 
stakeholders and no strategy for building linkages into the existing economic community. From their 
very conception, the IDZs were not structured in a manner conducive to regional development.  
 
3.2.3 Provincial Industrial Policy Framework 
 
The following section describes the EC industrial policies, strategies, and plans that are currently in 
place. The purpose of this section is to provide the specific context within which the policy critiques, 
implications, and suggestions presented in this thesis must be situated.  
 
The Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2004-2014 (PGDP) 
 
The PGDP has a long-term vision (2004 – 2014) to “make the EC a compelling place to live, work 
and invest in” (Office of the Premier 2004:1). It provides an assessment of the province’s 
development challenges and opportunities for growth, sets specific targets, and identifies six strategic 
focus areas for state intervention including “the development and diversification of the EC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 CEO of ELIDZ, as well as other interviews. 
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manufacturing sector”.  The PGDP lays out the following objectives and strategies to achieve the 
latter aim:  
• Develop agro-industries to spread opportunities to rural communities 
• Transform the auto sector to enhance local content and increase competitiveness 
• Diversify manufacturing by enhancing export capacity and downstream beneficiation 
• And promote provincial tourism to create employment in rural areas.  
The plan identifies four areas of potential for manufacturing growth: (1) export-oriented, high growth 
industries centred around the automotive industry; (2) subsectors with a historical presence in the 
province; (3) subsectors linked to raw materials sourced from the province; and (4) small, medium, 
and micro enterprises (SMMEs). These areas were selected based according to their (a) labour 
absorbing capacities; (b) potential for growth and linkages (especially with regard to raw material 
inputs sourced from the province); and (c) potential for linkages to export-oriented sectors with a 
special focus on those located within the IDZ. Specific growth strategies and interventions should be 
developed for each of the four areas of potential.  
 
The PGDP also sets broad goals and general outlines of the responsibilities of the provincial 
government and its associated agencies. Further planning for targeted interventions should be carried 
out in the following areas: (1) industrial planning for high-potential manufacturing subsectors; (2) 
sourcing of funding for research and development; (3) upgrading of infrastructure and provision of 
rail links; (4) application of a provincial government procurement policy; and (5) building a better 
relationship with the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) in order to promote skill 
development. 
Provincial Industrial Development Strategy 2010-2025  (PIDS) 
 
The PIDS was produced in March 2010 in response to the National Growth Plan (NGP) and the 
Industrial Policy Action Plan II (IPAP2) as a regional expression of the national goals outlined in the 
two documents. The strategy aligns itself with the national industrial policy strategy of utilising 
targeted public interventions to transform the economic structure of the province to promote both 
growth and a wider distribution of industrial activity.  
 
The strategy’s overarching vision, “a state-led industrialisation path towards a robust, resilient and 
sustainable industrial base by 2025,” is to be achieved through the pursuit of three goals—economic 
growth, labour absorption, and job retention (DEDEAT 2010: 3). The PIDS prioritises the following 
policy objectives in order to achieve those goals:  
1. Stabilise the rate of deindustrialisation in the region; 
2. Retain the productive and employment capacity of established industries; 
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3. Diversify the investment in a wide range of manufacturing activities; 
4. Expand productive capacity by promoting innovation and upgrading of infrastructure; 
5. Widen the spatial and structural distribution of income, capital, and industrial activity.  
 
The most significant aspect of the PIDS is its application of sectoral industrial policy. The strategy 
identifies priority sectors with the largest potential to transform the structure of the economy 
according to the following criteria: alignment with national development goals; labour absorption 
capacity; diversification into non-commodity, export-oriented sectors; potential for horizontal and 
vertical linkages; and potential benefit to Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). 
 
According to these criteria, the PIDS identifies six priority sectors, three of which are classified as 
non-automotive sectors: 
• Agro processing 
• Capital goods 
• Automotive 




According to the PIDS, Priority Industrial Action Plans are supposed to be developed for each of the 
selected priority sectors, detailing a strategy of intervention and specific objectives for each sector. 
This has not been accomplished, nor does it appear the EC Department of Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs, and Tourism (DEDEAT) office has made any progress toward the 
development of sector-specific strategies or sector-specific objectives.   
 
Provincial Jobs Strategy 2012-2015 (PJS) 
 
The purpose of the PJS is threefold—to provide “quantified and disaggregate job targets for 2012-
2015,” to identify the key challenges and opportunities for job creation in the EC, and to define and 
prioritise provincial government interventions to achieve the targets (Office of the Premier 2012: 1). 
The ultimate goal of the PJS is to create 150,000 jobs and equip 30,000 new skilled workers through 
artisan and learnership placements by 2015. The main implementing agent of the strategy is 
DEDEAT.  
 
The strategy is divided in to five pillars (Office of Premier 2012: 2):  
1. Retain jobs in established industries; 
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2. Create new jobs in priority sectors (Agriculture, Aquaculture, Minerals, Energy, Forestry, and 
Tourism); 
3. Expand social economy through the creation of “livelihood opportunities and EPWP 
[Expanded Public Works Programme] full-time equivalent jobs;” 
4. Increase the pace of infrastructure investment as a means of temporary job creation;  
5. Improve the skills development process. 
 
The PJS outlines 19 key intervention programmes, each provided with job creation estimates, an 
oversight agency, and prioritised objectives. These programmes remain at an infantile stage of 
planning and implementation. The critical issue with such an ambitious strategy is the lack of 
prioritisation of intervention programmes—a key shortcoming when dealing with the limited 
institutional capacity of DEDEAT (as detailed in Section 4.4.6).  
 
One of the strategy’s most important and feasible contributions is its suggestion to establish a Labour 
Market Research Unit within DEDEAT. This unit would be tasked with monitoring and evaluating the 
impact of the PJS; assembling a reliable and up-to-date provincial employment database that could be 
disaggregated by districts and subsectors; and researching specific labour market issues in order to 
provide policy feedback. This is an essential contribution due to the current level of reliability and 
specificity of employment data in the EC.  
 
Provincial Skills Development Strategy 2011-2016 (PSDS) 
 
The PSDS, a framework spanning 5-7 years, was prepared by the Provincial Skills Development 
Forum (PSDF) as a provincial response to the National Skills Development Strategy III (NSDS3) 
published in 2011. The Forum consisted of key stakeholders from provincial government, the IDZs, 
the SETAs, organised labour, and Eastern Cape universities and colleges. The goal of the strategy is 
to improve the provincial training delivery system to ensure that the skills produced in the EC meet 
the needs of the private sector in order attain higher productive levels necessary for the growth of 
industry (PSDF 2011).  
 
The PSDS outlines the current weakness specific to the EC skills delivery system (PSDF 2011: 1):  
• Limited capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of training; 
• Poor alignment between training outcomes and the needs of the private sector; 
• Urban bias with regard to location of training institutions; 
• Poor dissemination of information regarding training and employment opportunities; 
• Unreliable sources of funding for training facilities; 
• Low retention of skilled labour within the province.  
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In order to address these weaknesses the PSDS, identifies the following desired outcomes by the year 
2016: 
1. Create a credible information platform for planning and reporting skills development, specific 
to each district and sector; 
2. Ensure learners have access to quality training programmes and are equipped with relevant 
skills for economic environment; 
3. Partner with key stakeholders to that Further Education and Training (FET) colleges provide 
the necessary quantity and quality of training workers to meet the employment needs of the 
EC; 
4. Increase the foundational level of knowledge throughout the province, with a special focus on 
lagging rural areas; 
5. Support cooperative, SMME, non-governmental organisation (NGO), and community based 
training initiatives; 
6. Develop a Human Resources Development (HRD) Forum to build public sector capacity and 
coordination between provincial and municipal public service workers; 
7. Establish a career path guidance system to map out and communicate necessary qualifications 
for all sectors and subsectors.  
 
Each goal is directly aligned with the 7 national goals of the NSDS3 and is broken down into multiple 
province-specific objectives. Each objective is then divided further into desired outcomes, 




3.3 State of the Economy 
3.3.1 Key characteristics of the EC Economy 
 
The EC is home to 12.8% of the national population—6.7 million people. The region is marked by 
high inequality, poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. In 2012, the EC GDP per capita was 
R26, 000, just over half of South Africa’s GDP per capita, R48,000.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2008/9 global financial crisis, the precarious position of the EC has become 
increasingly evident. The EC has a number of characteristics that make it especially vulnerable to 
economic downturns: 
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• EC manufacturing is highly dependent on the automotive industry, concentrated in PE, 
Uitenhage and EL. The automotive subsector, dominated by Daimler Chrysler, Delta 
Corporation, and Volkswagen, currently accounts for 25.2% of EC manufacturing 
employment and 30.7% of the province’s GVA (Global Insight, 2013). The lack of diversity 
in the EC economy and continued reliance on the automotive sector provides little buffer 
from exogenous shocks and exacerbates the effects of a global downturn.  
 
• Non-automotive manufacturing GVA has been in decline. This is especially worrying as 
the EC attempts to maintain its manufacturing base and to diversify into new areas. After the 
removal of the apartheid-era decentralisation policy incentives, the low wage, high labour 
jobs that were drawn to the province steadily declined. For example, in the period 1995 to 
2008, in the textiles, clothing and leather goods sector, once a very strong sector in the EC, 
the sector’s share of total GVA declined 14.1%, while employment dropped 45.9% 
(Quantec 2009).    
 
• The EC has highly unequal spatial development. The EC is characterised as a rural 
province - 72% of the population lives outside of the two metros. The rural areas, including 
the former Transkei and Ciskei homelands, suffer from infrastructure backlogs, an 
underdeveloped agriculture sector, and little productive capacity. Outside of the commercial 
farming areas in Cacadu and Amatole districts, households rely on remittances and grants to 
supplement small-scale subsistence farming.   
 
• The EC’s population is highly dependent on grants and remittances. Average household 
incomes in the EC are very low. In 2010, the median monthly earnings of employees in the 
EC was R2,000, which is 20% less than the South African average. (StatsSA Monthly 
Earnings of South African, 2010). 50% of the EC households did not have a wage earner, 
compared to 37% for South Africa (StatsSA General Household Survey, 2011).  57% of EC 
households receive social grants (45% for South Africa). 22% of households receive 
remittances (StatsSA General Household Survey, 2011). In many areas, mostly concentrated 
in the former Ciskei and Transkei grants and remittances, surpass local GDP. 
 
3.3.2 Economic Growth 
 
From 1996 - 2012, the EC growth rate has fairly consistently fallen below the national GDP growth 
rate (Table 4). The average rate of growth for the period 1996 – 2012 for the EC was 2.7 percent—0.5 
percent lower than the national average of 3.2 percent. 
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Table 4: Percentage Growth in GDP (1996 – 2012: EC/RSA) 
 EC growth rate RSA growth rate 
1996 3.3 3.9 
1997 1.7 2.6 
1998 -0.5 0.5 
1999 2.3 2.2 
2000 4.3 4.0 
2001 2.7 2.7 
2002 1.6 3.6 
2003 2.6 2.9 
2004 3.6 4.6 
2005 4.9 5.3 
2006 5.4 5.6 
2007 5.4 5.5 
2008 3.7 3.6 
2009 -1.1 -1.5 
2010 2.4 3.1 
2011 3.4 3.5 
2012 2.5 2.5 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2013 
3.3.3 Development Indicators 
 
Table 5 gives a general overview of EC development indicators over the period 1996 – 2010. The EC 
has experienced only a marginal improvement in the Human Development Index (a composite 
measure of welfare and development) and in the poverty rate. Moreover, the EC trails the national 
average for every development indicator.  
 
Table 5: Development Indicators (1996 and 2010: RSA/EC) 
 EC 1996 EC 2010 SA 1996 SA 2010 
Human Development Index .49 .51 .56 .57 
Poverty rate (%) 55.5 52.0 40.6 41.3 
Gini Coefficient .62 .64 .62 .65 
Unemployment rate (%) 32.3 26.8 24.5 25.1 
Labour force participation rate (%) 53.3 44.1 62.0 52.0 
Source: Quantec 
 
It is important to note that, while the provincial unemployment rate has declined, the labour force 
participation rate experienced a substantial decrease, signifying an increase in the number of working-
age citizens that have become discouraged and have dropped out of the labour market. 2013 
employment data indicates that, when compared to national indictors, the EC suffers from a higher 
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unemployment rate, a lower labour force participation rate and a lower share of the population that is 
employed (Table 6). According to the most recent QLFS, less than one third of the EC population is 
employed.  
 
Table 6: Unemployment Rate and Labour Force Participation Rate (Q3 2013: RSA/EC) 
 RSA EC 
Unemployment rate 24.7 30.8 
Labor force participation rate 55.7 45.2 
Employed/population ratio (Absorption) 41.9 31.3 
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 3, 2013 (PO211) 
3.3.4 Economic Structure 
 
The economic structure of the EC differs from the rest of South Africa (Table 7). The primary sector 
is small and is the least developed sector in the province, contributing an average of 2% to provincial 
GDP. The contribution of the primary sector to provincial GDP is lower in the EC than any in any 
other province. In contrast, the contribution of the tertiary sector to GDP is significantly higher than 
any other province.  
 
Table 7: Sectoral Contribution to GDP: South Africa and Provinces 
 Primary % Secondary % Tertiary % 
South Africa 12.0 21.2 66.7 
EC 2.4 20.0 78.2 
Free State 17.3 17.3 65.5 
KZN 6.3 25.9 67.8 
NW 39.9 9.1 51.0 
Gauteng 3.3 24.9 71.6 
Mpumalanga 25.6 26.3 48.1 
Limpopo 35.3 8.3 56.4 
Western Cape 4.3 22.7 73.0 
Northern Cape 41.5 6.8 51.7 
Source: StatsSA 2010 
Primary Sector 
 
The EC primary sector is small in comparison to the national contribution and has been in decline 
since 1995 (PIDS 2010). The dominant contributing subsectors are agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 
representing 94.6% of all output in the sector. These activities are mainly concentrated in the Cacadu, 
Amatole, and Chris Hani districts—districts that contain the vast majority of commercial farming 
enterprises and were historically favoured during apartheid-era agriculture subsidies. The former 
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homeland districts of OR Tambo and Alfred Nzo, where farming is limited to small-scale subsistence 
farming and land is greatly underutilised, contribute the least to the primary sector. 
Secondary Sector 
 
The secondary sector has contributed an average of around 20% to the provincial economy since 
1995. Manufacturing activities make up the vast majority of the sector, comprising 83.4% of the 
secondary sector (DEDEAT 2010). The EC is responsible for 7.8% of the output of the national 
manufacturing industry. Spatially, activity in the secondary sector is largely concentrated in the East 
London (Buffalo City) and Port Elizabeth (Nelson Mandela Bay) metropoles. The two metropoles 
currently account for 87% of all manufacturing activities.  
Tertiary Sector 
 
The largest tertiary subsector is general government services. General government services account 
for over one-third (34%) of EC GDP. Particularly since 1995, in line with national trends, finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services (FIRBS) have grown substantially - by 140% in constant 
prices. This is almost three times the real growth in GDP (ECPC Working Paper 2013). The inflated 
tertiary sector, bolstered by EC’s reliance on the government services sector’s contribution to 
provincial GDP, renders the EC vulnerable to any contraction in national government spending and is 
a point of serious concern.  
3.3.5 The Manufacturing Sector 
 
Manufacturing Growth Rate 
 
The growth in manufacturing in the EC closely tracks that of the national (Figure 1). However, it is 
important to note that, while the EC GDP performs below the national average almost consistently 
from 1996-2012, the EC manufacturing growth rate more often outperforms the national and faired 
better than South Africa through the recession and subsequent rebound period (2008-2012). The EC 
aggregate manufacturing growth rate (over the period 1996 – 2012, grew by 54.3 percent as compared 
to 50.8 percent nationally (Quantec 2013).  
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Figure 1: Manufacturing growth rate (Gross Value Added) (1996 – 2012: EC/RSA) 
 
Contrary to expectations, the EC’s share of national (RSA) manufacturing output, as measured by 
GVA, has increased. When compared to other measures of manufacturing output (value added at 
factor cost and output at basic prices), the EC share has declined. However, this decline is very 
marginal (Table 8). EC manufacturing output has consistently contributed roughly 8 percent to 
national manufacturing output since 1995. It is worth noting that, while these statistics demonstrate a 
clear trend, they are based on statistics heavily influenced by the last official manufacturing census, 
collected in 1996, and, therefore, may underestimate the real changes in share of manufacturing 
output (this limitation of the data is discussed further in Section 1.3.1).  
 
Table 8: EC as share of RSA Total Manufacturing Output (%), 1995 - 2011 
 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009 2011 
GVA at 
basic prices 




7.97 7.94 7.76 7.78 7.79 7.83 
Output at 
basic prices 
8.57 8.97 8.77 8,7 8.4 8.52 
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According to aggregate manufacturing data, the EC has faired relatively well from 1995-2011.  Given 
the perception that the province’s manufacturing sector has experienced a steady decline (conveyed 
by multiple EC public development agencies), the data is surprising. However, the sector’s 
performance can be attributed to the high rates of growth in the automotive and automotive and 
automotive components sector.  
 
When the EC and RSA transport manufacturing subsector outputs are deducted from EC and RSA 
aggregate manufacturing outputs (respectively), the EC’s contribution to national NAM falls to 
roughly 6.6 percent. This share remains relatively constant from 1995-2011 (Table 9). 
 
According to the data, the performance and consistency of EC NAM is still better than expected. The 
most probable explanation for this discrepancy is the close alignment of non-automotive firms with 
the automotive industry in the EC.  Many firms classified in “non-automotive” subsectors benefit, 
either directly or indirectly, from government support for the automotive and automotive components 
subsector. For example, the production of tyres and leather seats feed into the auto industry supply 
chain, but are classified under “Petroleum products, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics” and “Textiles, 
Clothing, and Leather Goods,” respectively. Due to the limited level of manufacturing data 
disaggregation, this thesis can only assume that if “auto related” firms were also deducted from total 
EC manufacturing output, the performance of the EC non-auto subsectors would be significantly 
lower.  
 
Table 9:  EC as share of RSA Total Manufacturing Output less transport sub-sector 
(%), 1995-2011 
 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009 2011 
GVA at 
basic prices 




6.66 6.44 6.34 6.40 6.75 6.63 
Output at 
basic prices 
6.67 6,48 6.37 6.44 6.67 6.62 
Source: Data supplied by Quantec 
 
When the manufacturing sector is disaggregated into subsectors, the EC outperforms the national in 
terms of GVA growth from 1996 to 2012 in only two of the ten subsectors—textiles, clothing and 
leather goods and metal products and machinery (Table 10). It is important to note that these two 
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subsectors are very closely aligned with the automotive and automotive components subsectors. 
Overall, EC subsector performance generally follows the national output growth trajectory—the 
differences between the provincial and national subsector growth patterns are not significant.  
 
Table 10: Growth in Output (Gross Manufacturing Value Added) (1996 – 2012: 
EC/RSA) 


















Food, beverages and tobacco 19.3 16.9 32.7   17.1 14.6 31.3 
Textiles, clothing and leather goods 4.9 4.2 31.7   8.9 7.8 36.4 
Wood and wood  10.2 8.4 24.4   4.7 3.7 23.3 
Fuel, petroleum, chemical &rubber  19.7 25.7 97.0   17.3 20.3 80.7 
Other non-metallic mineral  5.2 3.3 -3.3   3.7 2.3 -3.4 
Metal products, machinery  20.1 19.0 42.0   9.2 8.8 47.2 
 Electrical machinery and apparatus 2.4 2.8 75.2   3.5 4.0 74.8 
 Electronic, sound/vision, medical  1.5 1.7 72.0   1.0 1.1 71.1 
Transport equipment 7.8 9.8 89.5   26.6 30.7 78.1 
 Furniture and other items  8.9 8.0 36.0   7.8 6.6 29.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 50.8   100.0 100.0 54.3 
Source: Data supplied by ECSECC 
3.3.6 Spatial Overview 
 
Industrial activity is highly concentrated in the two metros (Table 11). 87% of all manufacturing is 
concentrated in the two metros, Buffalo City (EL and its surrounding areas) and Nelson Mandela Bay 
(PE and its surrounding areas). Moreover, the concentration is increasing— Nelson Mandela Bay and 
Buffalo City and Cacadu (Uitenhage, Grahamstown) are the only districts that have registered any 
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Table 11: Growth in Manufacturing (1996 - 2012: By District) 
% change GVA 




Nelson Mandela Bay 63.7 59.9 27.0 
 Buffalo City 73.7 68.7 26.7 
Cacadu DM 62.7 65.6 27.5 
Amatole DM 44.0 20.2 30.4 
Chris Hani DM 34.2 4.3 27.9 
Joe Gqabi DM 21.4 -16.6 27.0 
O.R.Tambo DM 40.7 10.3 34.9 
Alfred Nzo DM 27.4 0.7 30.3 
Source: Global Insight, 2013 
3.3.7 Sectoral Composition 
 
Table 12 shows a break down of the EC manufacturing sector as compared to the national 
composition. There are two outstanding features of the sectoral composition of manufacturing for the 
EC as opposed to the national (RSA): 
• Significantly greater share of the labour intensive sectors – textiles, clothing and leather 
goods – (and to a lesser extent electrical machinery and apparatus) 
• Significantly greater share of transport equipment (autos and components) 
• Significantly lower share of raw material intensive products – metal products, machinery; 
fuel, petroleum, chemicals and rubber; wood and wood products. 




GVA   
% RSA 
GVA 
Food, beverages and tobacco 14.6   16.9 
Textiles, clothing and leather goods 7.8   4.2 
Wood and wood  3.7   8.4 
Fuel, petroleum, chemical &rubber  20.3   25.7 
Other non-metallic mineral  2.3   3.3 
Metal products, machinery  8.8   19.0 
 Electrical machinery and apparatus 4.0   2.8 
 Electronic, sound/vision, medical  1.1   1.7 
Transport equipment 30.7   9.8 
 Furniture and other items  6.6   8.0 
TOTAL 100.0   100.0 
Source: Global Insight, 2013 
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3.3.8 Employment 
 
Sourcing reliable and consistent formal manufacturing employment data the EC province is a 
considerable challenge. This challenge is addressed in Section 1.3.1. 
 
The best estimate for total formal employment in the EC manufacturing sector is 90,297 at the end of 
2011, constituting a 7.8 percent share of national formal manufacturing employment, down from a 7.9 
percent share in 2005, and an 8.7 percent share in 1996 (Table 13). When the transport-manufacturing 
subsector is excluded, the EC NAM employment is 67,499, a 6.4 percent share of the national NAM 
employment, down from a 6.5 percent share in 2005, and a 7.6 percent share in 1996. These figures 
reflect a similar pattern to the share of EC manufacturing and NAM output described in Section 3.3.5.  
 
The decline in manufacturing employment in the EC since the early 1990s is in line with the national 
downward trend. However, the EC’s manufacturing employment has declined at a much faster rate 
than national manufacturing employment. From 1996-2011 EC total manufacturing employment 
declined 31 percent, compared to the national decrease of 23 percent. During that same period, EC 
NAM declined 36 percent, compared to the national decrease of 24 percent.  The comparison between 
provincial and national rates of employment contraction stands in contrast to the relatively constant 
share of manufacturing output over the same period (Section 3.3.5).  
 
Table 13: Formal Manufacturing Employment RSA & EC total manufacturing & total 
manufacturing less transport sub-sector, numbers & % changes, 1996-2011 
 1996 2005 % Change 
1996-2005 
2011 % Change 
1996-2011 
RSA      
Total Manufacturing 1498941 1321676 -12 1150667 -23 
Transport 118024 121593 -3 102490 -13 
Total Manufacturing less Transport 1380924 1200083 -13 1048177 -24 
EC      
Total Manufacturing 130949 105090 -20 90297 -31 
Transport 25885 26909 4 22798 -12 
Total Manufacturing less Transport 105064 78181 -26 67499 -36 
Source: RSA Manufacturing employment – Quantec 
EC Manufacturing Data Global Insight (supplied by ECSSEC) 
 
Table 14 disaggregates employment numbers by manufacturing subsector. From 1996-2012, every 
manufacturing subsector in the EC has demonstrated a decrease in employment. The two largest 
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percentage decreases are in the textiles, clothing, and leather goods subsector, a 59 percent decrease, 
and the electrical machinery and apparatus subsector, a 61 percent decrease. The contraction is 
significant due to the fact that these two subsectors are regarded as the most labour-intensive 
industries with the greatest capacity for unskilled labour absorption.  These two sectors alone were 
responsible for 55 percent of all EC manufacturing job losses (22,481 jobs) from 1996-2012.  
 
Table 14: EC Manufacturing Sectors - Number of formally employed 1996-012 
 1996 2000 2005 2009 2012 ’96–‘12 %  - 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
products 15 816 13 003 11 567 13 339 15 044  -  772  -  5% 
Textiles, clothing, leather  25 989 21 999 17 790 12 942 10 744  -  15245  -  59% 
Wood and wood products 8 960 9 901 7 198 7 366 6 369  - 2491  -  28% 
Fuel, petroleum, chemical 
and rubber products 16 195 17 087 14 120 11 674 10 958  -  5237  -  32% 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 4 283 2 403 2 841 2 780 2 555  -  1728  -  40% 
Metal products, machinery 
and household appliances 14 895 11 888 12 031 13 181 12 230  -  2665  -  18% 
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 11 949 11 476 6 472 4 681 4 623  -  7236  -  61% 
Electronic, sound/vision, 
medical & other appliances 2 033 1 772 1 168 1 213 1 042  -  991  -  49% 
Transport equipment 25 885 22 508 26 909 27 816 22 798  -  3087  -  12% 
Furniture and other items 
NEC and recycling 4 944 4 163 4 994 4 347 3 934  -  1010  -  20% 
Electricity, gas, steam and 
hot water supply 3 029 2 836 2 765 2 774 2 592  -  437  -  14% 
Total 130949 116200 105090 99339 90297  -  40652  -  31% 
Source: Data supplied by ECSECC 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The data highlights three significant trends that have important policy implications for the EC 
manufacturing sector:  
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1. Post 1995, the EC has marginally outperformed the national total manufacturing output 
growth. The province’s share of national manufacturing output, as well as national NAM 
output, has remained relatively constant. With respect to disaggregate manufacturing 
subsector performance, the EC exceed national growth in textiles, clothing, and leather goods 
and metal products and machinery; however, the province has generally followed the national 
pattern of subsector growth since 1996.  
 
2. In contrast with output performance, EC manufacturing employment as declined at a much 
faster rate than the national trend. Every EC manufacturing subsector has experienced a 
contraction in employment. The two subsectors that have faced the most significant job 
losses—textiles, clothing and leather goods and electrical machinery and apparatus—are the 
two subsectors with the greatest potential for labour absorption in unskilled, labour-intensive 
activities.  
 
Nationally, the combination of moderate output growth and declining levels of employment signifies 
an increasing reliance on capital-intensive production processes. On a provincial level, moderate 
output growth paired with an even greater decrease in employment levels, suggests a more significant 
increase of capital intensity in the EC. This trend is demonstrated across both automotive and NAM 
sectors.  
 
3. The EC has significantly higher levels of unemployment and lower rates of labour force 
participation when compared to the national level. This fact, when paired with the trends of 
rapid job shedding and capital intensification, indicates the true source of the crisis occurring 
in the EC.  
 
The current state of the EC economy must viewed within the context of the historical processes that 
have shaped the structure and spatial concentration of industry in the province. Apartheid-era policies, 
drawing labour-intensive manufacturing industries to the area with generous incentives that were 
withdrawn abruptly after 1992, have left a large pool of experienced labourers without jobs.  
 
Post-1994 provincial industrial policies have accomplished little with regard to addressing this crisis. 
The policies in place are largely a reflection of national industrial policy. While this is significant for 
the sake of coherence and national alignment, it is important to avoid a blanket application of national 
policies to a regional setting. It is necessary for the EC to create policy tailored to the issues specific 
to the region and sensitive to the historical processes through which those issues were created.   
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Moreover, it is necessary for the regional policies to reflect the institutional capacity of the province’s 
developmental agencies. The current provincial policy framework, on paper, provides a long list of 
possible public interventions. These interventions check all the boxes—specific objectives, 
responsible agencies, timelines, and concrete outcomes—however; the lack of policy prioritization in 
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Chapter 4: Interview Summary of Identified Constraints and 
Suggested Policy Proposals 
 
 
4.1 Firm Selection and Characteristics 
4.1.1 Firm Selection 
 
The firm selection process is detailed in Section 1.3.2. Firms were selected from 3 subsectors—food, 
beverages, and tobacco; metals, metal products, machinery and equipment; and textiles, clothing and 
leather goods—as well as a fourth category, labelled “other” in this section, which includes NAM 
firms involved in the construction, light manufacturing, electronics, and plastics subsectors. The auto 
and auto components sector was generally excluded. These subsectors were selected based on current 
levels of employment, evidence of an upward trend in employment levels since 1995, and prospects 
for raising future employment levels. 
 
Within each sector, it was attempted to interview firms of different sizes – small, medium and large as 
denoted by employment levels (see Table 15). We attempted to get a relatively even distribution of 
firms by location and by sector. The following table summarises the firm selection:  
 
Table 15: Selected Firm Distribution 
 
 
4.1.2 Firm Demographics 
 
An outstanding feature of the firms interviewed was how long they have been established. There was 
very little sign of new firm entry. Table 16 indicates the date of each firm’s establishment in the EC 
—highlighted firms are those that were established after 1991. 21 out of the 25 firms interviewed 
were established before 1991 (the oldest firm dates back to 1937). Only three of the twenty-five firms 
were established within the past 15 years—1999, 2001, and 2006—an indication of the limited 
number of new entrants into the EC manufacturing sector. The two firms that were most recently 
established, in 2001 and 2006, Fred Footwear and Inca Bricks respectively, are both black-owned 
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firms. The remaining firms are either white-owned family businesses or part of large multinational 
companies. 
 
Table 16: Date of Firm Establishment 
 
 
Most of the firms were established when the EC benefitted from a series of large government 
incentives programmes.  Many firms interviewed were established during the height of the 
decentralisation policy (Table 17). 12 firms were established between 1971 and 1991, during the most 
generous period of government incentives under the Revised Decentralisation Policy and RIDP I. 
Now that those government support systems are gone, many of the firms are struggling to stay afloat. 
A typical refrain was “We are here by a historical accident.” “The cost advantage that we had is long 
gone here.”  
 
Table 17: Number of Firms Established and Average Age of Firm by Period 
 
 
There was a strong preponderance of firm owners and manager who were born and/or grew up in the 
region. They professed strong loyalties to the region and expressed a strong desire to stay in the 
region even though, as they put it, they might have “done better elsewhere.” 
 
4.1.3 Firm Growth 
 
 
Of the 25 firms interviewed, 10 firms indicated growth in turnover within the last 5-10 years.  
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The firms that have expanded their output are evenly split between EL and PE locations. There was 
no apparent pattern of growth or contraction differentiated according to sector. Interviewees identified 
a number of factors as contributing to firm growth. These included: ability to respond flexibly to the 
market; to produce specialised orders, and to deliver timeously, Expanding firms stressed that they 
also enhanced the quality of their product and moved to higher value-added products. These firms 
regarded their understanding of the needs of the African market as superior to that of their 
competitors. 
 
A notable feature, however, of firms that increased output was how few of them simultaneously 
increased employment. Only 4 of 10 firms that had increased output had also increased employment. 
These 4 firms had, on average, increased employment by 56% over the past 5- 10 years. All of the 
firms that had decreased employment while growing output were clear that they had turned to 
increasingly mechanised production processes in order to cut down on labour costs. They saw 
increased mechanisation as the primary explanatory factor listed for their growth.  
 
The remaining 21 firms have all decreased employment. For these firms, the overall decrease in 
employment was an average of 47% in the past 5-10 years. This ranged from a 95% decrease to a 
20% decrease. One outlier, in food processing, excluded from the average, decreased its employment 
from 1000 employees to 160 over the past 10 years. The major factors in the firm’s contraction were 
increased cost of local inputs, cost of labour, and lack of local raw materials available.  
 
There was a noticeable pessimism as to future prospects. Only 6 out of the 25 firms are planning on 
expanding in the near future.5 Of those that indicated hope for expansion, 4 planned to grow by 
expanding exports to African countries specifically and 2 planned to move to more diversified and 
higher value added products.  The remaining 19 firms did not express any intention to expand. 11 of 
those firms have been significantly contracting over the past 5-10 years and indicated that they 
expected that downward trend to continue.  
 
Table 18 divides the number of firms interviewed in each sector in terms of exports as a share of total 
turnover. Twenty firms only sell to the domestic market. Nine export less than 10% of turnover and, 
of those 9 firms, 4 firms have experienced a steady decline in their share of exports to less than 5% 
with no plans or hope of reversing this trend. The 4 firms that export 10-50% of turnover all export 
primarily to African countries and they all expressed interest in continuing to grow exports to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As a percentage of total firms interviewed—just under 25 percent—this may not be a strong indicator of 
pessimism unique to the Eastern Cape, but rather a reflection of the national sentiment given the current 
economic climate. Furthermore, during the interview process, the definition of “expansion” was left open-ended, 
posed as expansion in output, employment, or turnover. Interviewees were left to define the term according to 
the definition they deemed most relevant for their current position.  
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continent. The 2 major exporters, exporting 85% and 98% of their turnover, are both in the 
food/beverage sector and primarily export to first world markets in North America and Europe.  
 
Table 18: Share of Exports in Turnover by Sector 
 
 
Of the 10 firms interviewed that have expanded their output, 6 exclusively supply the domestic 
market. Of the 4 exporting firms, 3 export to the African market. These firms have experienced an 
upward trend in export growth and all 3 intend to expand further into the African market in order to 
grow their business. 2 of the non-exporting firms supply directly to distributors that are significant 
exporters and are, therefore, indirectly affected by export performance. Ultimately, 6 out of the 10 
growing firms are direct or indirect exporters.  
 
Accordingly, a high proportion of firms that have expanded their output are exporters – direct or 
indirect. This is not surprising. The share of South African manufacturing output exported has 
increased from 15% in 1995 to almost one-third currently. Manufacturing for export has grown far 
more rapidly than manufacturing for the domestic market.  Moreover, significant shares of exporting 
firms, by contrast with non-exporting firms, express optimism as to future prospects for expansion. 
 
This underlines the importance to EC manufacturing prospects of strategies designed to enhance 
exports. 
 
Three of the firms that have expanded output are in the clothing, textile and footwear sector. Only one 
of these firms is subject to metro wage rates. The three growing food/beverage firms all negotiate 
wages at plant level. A further three firms located in metals, plastics and electronics sectors firms are 
subject to MEIBC wage rates. However, one firm is non-complaint with MEIBC wage standards. 
There appears, therefore, to be an association between firms that have flexibility as to wage 
determination and expansion in their output. 
 
Two of the four firms that increased employment had some flexibility with respect to wages paid. One 
firm has plant level bargaining. Another belongs to the MEIBC, but is non-compliant. The number of 
firms increasing employment is too small to give any clear indication of an association between firms 
that have increased their labour complement and flexibility with respect to wage determination. 
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Nevertheless, the majority of firms interviewed held the opinion that, where the bargaining council 
imposed stringent wages, and failed to take account of local conditions, firms struggled to grow. 
 
4.2 Identified Constraints – Firm Perceptions 
 
Interviews with firms and key informants focused on the factors that were constraining firm output 
and employment growth. 
 
While there were differences--by sector, by metropole and by size of firm (see below)--interviewees 
consistently raised the same issues albeit with some difference of emphasis. Moreover, there were no 
surprises – although encouraged to identify other constraints than the ones posed to them, firms did 
not identify anything that was unexpected. 
 
The similarity of response strongly suggests that, although the number of firms interviewed was 
limited (25) and firms were not chosen via a randomised sampling process, the responses obtained 
with regard to constraints are representative of the non-auto manufacturing firms in the two EC 
metropoles in general. 
4.2.1 Ranking of constraints 
 
Firms were asked to rank 8 constraints to growth—labour costs, labour productivity, shortage of 
skills, transport costs, electricity costs, local competition, competition from imports, and lack of 
government support—on a scale from 1-10, with 1 being not constraining at all and 10 being very 
constraining. Table 19 summarizes the average scores across all interviewed firms and average scores 
by metropole. The number of firms that responded above 7 in respect of each constraint is listed as 
well. Interviewees in both regions identified transport and electricity costs, and competition from 
imports as the most important constraints.  
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Table 19: Constraints by Metropolitan Area 
 
 
Firms were also asked to list any other constraints that were not on the questionnaire list, although 
they were not asked to rate them on a scale of 1-10. The most common additional constraints were: 
(1) limited flexibility of labour, difficulty in hiring/firing (a consensus across all firms in all sectors); 
(2) lack of demand (especially apparent in the Metals and Metal product sectors); and (3) lack of raw 
materials (in the Food/Beverage sectors).  
 
When asked to elaborate on the constraints that are currently most binding on any future expansion, 
firms invariably came back to issues of wage rates and the difficulties and costs entailed in dismissing 
workers. These were the pre-eminent factors that both constrained growth and, more particularly, 
constrained firms from increasing employment in the event of any growth. There was a feeling of 
resignation by firms that government would never address these issues and that, their position, with 
regard to labour constraints, would continue to get worse. Most firms held the belief that wages were 
likely to continue to rise and the labour market would become more inflexible over time. 
 
Manufacturers also complained about a lack of demand – to be expected in an economy where growth 
is currently little over 2%. Poor demand conditions at home combined with continuing economic 
difficulties in many export markets – especially in Europe – is a key constraint. To counteract this 
lack of demand, a few firms proposed that provincial and local government in the EC give preference 
in procurement to local (regional) manufacturers. 
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4.2.2 Constraints by Metropole 
 
The two regions differ significantly in terms of their ranking of transport costs and lack of 
government support as constraints: 
 
Firms located in EL scored transport costs far higher than firms in PE. This is expected due to PE’s 
access to two ports. While both areas have to bear the cost of transporting finished goods to Gauteng 
and Cape Town, firms in the EL area have the added cost of transporting their inputs from ports in PE 
or Durban.  
 
A feeder vessel is offered from PE to EL. However only 2 of the EL firms interviewed mentioned 
utilising the port. Where they did utilise the feeder vessel, use was minimal. The proposal of 
establishing a second feeder vessel that would operate at a subsidised rate was not met with any 
enthusiasm by the firms. The main mode of transporting local goods, both inputs and outputs, is by 
road, offering the fastest, most flexible, and most cost effective method of transport.  
 
The EL port is the only river port in the country. Its deepest point is 11.3 metres. The port is very 
shallow and narrow and cannot handle deep-sea vessels. This is not only an issue for firms 
transporting inputs and outputs out of EL, it is an issue for drawing potential export-oriented firms to 
the area, especially to the ELIDZ: “Unless we have someone taking our port seriously, it is hard to 
convince any exporter to come here.”  
 
Lack of government support is rated much higher as a constraint in EL compared to PE. This could be 
the case for a number of reasons. EL and the surrounding regions contain many previously 
industrialised areas that benefitted from the apartheid-era decentralisation policy. The firms currently 
located in these areas were firms originally drawn to the area because of these incentives or, 
alternatively, firms that had deep historical roots and were able to grow as a result of these incentives. 
In the absence of any incentives, they are now struggling to survive. There is understandably a strong 
feeling that the abandonment of regional decentralisation initiatives in the post- apartheid era has led 
to neglect of industry and an exacerbation of unemployment in this sub region. The historical record 
of government support to manufacturing firms in EL is seen as being in sharp contrast to the current 
lack of any significant support.  
 
There was also a perception amongst the firms and key informants (i.e. the East London Chamber of 
Business) that PE is favoured when it comes to government involvement. It was frequently claimed 
by EL firms that the Coega IDZ receives much more government attention and support than the 
ELIDZ. This point was also reiterated when it came to the amount of attention government and 
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government enterprises, like Transnet, pay to the rail and port links to and from EL in comparison to 
PE.  
 
4.3.3 Constraints by sector   
 
Clothing, Textiles, and Footwear 
 
As expected, for firms in the clothing, textiles and leather sector, the labour costs and competition 
from imports were identified as the two most binding constraints. Despite high levels of protection, 
this sector, both nationally and even more so in the EC, has seen the largest reduction in employment. 
 
Table 20: Average Constraint Scores – Clothing/Textiles/Footwear Sector 
 
 
Food and Beverages 
 
Firms in the food and beverages sector identified securing supply of inputs as the key constraint. 
Some of the most successful firms, both in terms of output and employment growth, are located in this 
sector and extensively utilise local agricultural inputs. Difficulty in expanding local supply is 
currently curtailing their future growth. 
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Table 21: Average Constraint Scores – Food/Beverage Sector 
 
 
Metals and Metal Products 
 
Firms in this sector placed a particular emphasis on costs of transport. These firms have a double 
transport burden – transporting heavy inputs from “up country” and transporting the finished products 
to domestic customers, most of whom are located at some distance from the plant. Rail is expensive 
and is widely perceived to be unreliable. As a result, firms invariably use road transport. 
 
 




The 10 firms that are non-automotive manufacturers involved in the construction, light 
manufacturing, electronics, and plastics sectors, identified transport costs and electricity costs as their 
main constraints. These firms have many of the same characteristics as firms in the metals and metal 
products subsector, especially with regard to high transport requirements for both inputs and outputs, 
so it is not surprising that the constraint scores are comparable between the two subsectors.  
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Table 23: Average Constraint Scores – Other Sectors 
 
 
4.2.4 Constraints by Firm Size 
 
The largest disparity in the average constraint score by firm size was in the category of low 
productivity (Table 24). While low productivity scored relatively low (5.5 and 5.8) for small and 
medium size firms it scored a 10 for both large firms.  Many of the small and medium size firms 
interviewed made note of the very close relationships they have maintained with their employees. 
Many firms employed multiple generations within one family and these families have formed close 
ties with the owners over decades of employment. The formation of close working relationships may 
translate into increased levels of skill and efficiency built over time in the workplace.  
 
Table 24: Average Constraint Scores by Firm Size 
 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, small firms did not have an issue with finding skills. Many of these firms 
were previously much larger in terms of turnover and employment and have downsized over the 
years. They indicated that they have access to a pool of labourers who were previously employed and 
trained by their firm that they can draw from if the need arises. They also indicated very low levels of 
employee turnover, which decreased their need to search out skilled workers. 
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4.3 Assessing the Constraints  
4.3.1 Electricity  
 
Complaints about increasing electricity charges over the last few years and the constraints that it 
placed on their business were universal amongst the firms interviewed. The complaints were focused 
on costs. Firms did not regard electricity disruptions as a problem nor did they have a view that the 
EC suffered more from disruptions of supply than other areas. Disruptions in electricity provision 
were not indicated as a problem for any of the firms interviewed.  
 
A number of firms have seen very large increases in electricity costs. Firms claimed that their 
electricity costs had increased anywhere from four to five times over the past five years. Firms 
recognised, correctly, that the municipality mark-up is a major factor in the increase. A typical 
response was “The municipality lives on the mark-up.” In addition, the agro-processing firms all 
faced increases in costs relating to effluent charges. All agro-processing firms listed effluent charges 
as one of their major constraints.  
 
There is a widespread view that municipalities in the EC charge relatively higher electricity rates than 
the national level. And indeed this is borne out by the data. PE charges the third highest rates in the 
country (Minutes from meeting between MEC Jonas and NERSA [National Energy Regulator of 
South Africa] April 2013). Table 25 shows a comparison between PE, Cape Town, and Eskom 
reduced Megaflex rates. The PE rate is R.81 per KWh, compared to R.68 per KWh for Cape Town—
almost a 20% differential. Table 26 gives an indication of how much rates have increased from 2000 
for PE (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality) compared to Eskom price increases. PE electricity prices 
have increased at a much higher rate than Eskom prices, resulting, by 2012, in a 21% difference in the 
yearly rate of increase.  
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Table 25: Halberg Guss PE Foundry Electricity Usage 2011/2012 
  
Source: NMB High Electricity Users presentation, 15 September 2011 (data supplied by ECSECC) 
 
 
Table 26: Price Escalation in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro 2000-2012 
 
Source: National Foundry Technology Network presentation to NERSA, 23 February 2012 
 
In response to the electricity increases, many firms are taking steps to reduce their electricity bill.  
 
• Energy-intensive firms use boilers to supplement Eskom power. However, they have to 
transport heavy furnace oil (from PE or Durban for those in EL), which adds to transportation 
costs. One large firm switched from oil to coal to relieve the cost of transport, other firms are 
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reluctantly considering doing the same, noting that, although coal is less environmentally 
friendly, it is cheaper to transport.  
 
• One large firm shut down a product line because the cost to produce in terms of electricity 
was too high. 
 
• One firm hired a specialist consultant to negotiate with the municipality to bring their rates 
down.  
 
• A number of firms are looking far more closely at installing solar power.  
 
Firms also noted that they get charged the same price for electricity during a 24 period. They asked 




The cost of transport is more of a burden for firms located in EL and its surrounding area. EL firms 
have to get inputs from ports in either Durban or PE and transport them by road to EL. Two firms 
noted that they use the feeder vessel from PE to the EL port, but none of the firms were enthusiastic 
about the proposal of an additional feeder vessel at subsidised rates. All responded that they would 
continue to use road transport as their primary means of transporting inputs and outputs due to the 
flexibility, timeliness and cost.  
 
In general, firms whose many competitors were local, found themselves disadvantaged by their 
location. It cost them more and took them longer to get finished products to the main markets in Cape 
Town and Gauteng.  Firms whose main competition in the domestic market is foreign competition 
from imports, listed proximity to market as one of their advantages. They could get an order to their 
customer in South Africa much faster than an order coming in from their Asian competitors. Those 
firms that had cornered the South African market and had little domestic competition could not beat 
their foreign competitors on price, but they could offer quicker response times and more specialised 
design to meet customer demands.  
 
Cost of transporting personnel—airline travel—was consistently listed as a major cost. Flights to/from 
EL and PE are among the most expensive flights in South Africa per km. Flights to Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, and Durban to/from PE and EL are dominated by South African Airways. Low cost 
price flight options are relatively scarce. As result, the cost involved in air travel, a necessity in order 
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to visit clients, meet customers face-to-face, meet international clients, visit showrooms, etc - all of 
which occur outside of the EC - is very significant. One medium-sized textile company located in the 
EL metro claimed that it cost them R250,000 a year to meet with clients around the country. Firms 
noted that they often have to fly technicians and specialised workers down from Cape Town or 
Gauteng because they cannot find anyone in the EC who is qualified to do a particular job.  
 
Frequency is also a major problem – flights in and out of PE and, particularly, EL are far less frequent 
than flights in/out of other centres of manufacturing. South African Airways offers 3 flights a day 
between Cape Town and EL; and 5 flights a day between Johannesburg and EL. British Airways and 
South African Airways offer 3 direct flights a day between Cape Town and PE; 12 a day between 




Wages are determined differently for each of the different subsectors interviewed. Regardless of the 
manner in which they are determined, for most of the firms interviewed, wages were identical or very 
similar to wages paid in the more “advanced” manufacturing areas, namely Cape Town and Gauteng.  
Clothing/Textiles 
 
Wages are determined by a centralised bargaining system, but differentiated between metro and non-
metro. However, the metro/non-metro differentiation only operates in clothing and not textiles. As a 
result, textile firms located outside of the metros do not benefit from non-metro wage rates. None of 
the clothing and textile firms interviewed operated under non-metro wage rates. Textiles firms located 
outside of the city centres were adamant that this put them at an “unfair” disadvantage. They argued 
that costs of living were lower than in the other manufacturing areas and that this dispensation was a 
major factor constraining their growth, curtailing their hiring, and, in many cases, has resulted in 





High wage rates were by far the largest complaint by firms in the metals/machinery/plastics sub-
sectors. These firms were most vocal in their condemnation of the wage bargaining system. In this 
sector, wage rates are centrally determined by the MEIBC. Representation in the bargaining council is 
based on number of employees. As a result, the council is dominated by the five big metal 
corporations. Plastics have been trying to separate themselves from the MEIBC for the last 4-5 years, 
but without effect.  
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A number of firms have applied for exemptions from the bargaining council. Firms claim that the 
process is cumbersome and does not run efficiently. If an exemption is granted, it is for one year only, 
and, thereafter; the firm is expected to play catch-up. This is an unrealistic expectation and firms 
granted exemption often become non-compliant the following year: “The exemption process does not 




In the agro-processing subsector, wages are bargained on the shop floor at plant level and are, 
therefore, viewed as less of a constraint on growth. Benefiting from the absence of a central 
bargaining system, wages tend to settle below those in Cape Town and Gauteng, giving the EC 
somewhat of an advantage. While not conclusive, the argument could be made that relatively lower 
wage levels have been a contributing factor to the minimal job losses in the subsector—the food and 
beverage subsector has had by far the lowest job losses in the EC.  
Labour Flexibility  
 
Apart from wages, firms were also concerned about hiring and firing regulations. The difficulties and 
costs entailed in firing are a very significant problem for firms across all sectors that have cyclical 
demand or large variations in order volumes. Many of these firms rely on labour brokers for seasonal 
or part-time workers, but can only keep them for a maximum of 3 month. This places limits on the 
volume of orders they can take on at one time.  
 
4.3.4 Shortage of Skills 
 
None of the firms, regardless of sector or location, had any difficulties finding low skilled or semi-
skilled labourers. Both EL and PE have long histories of manufacturing. Job shedding, especially in 
the clothing and textiles sector, has resulted in many labourers, trained at previous jobs, with the 
necessary skills, but without opportunities for employment. Most firms reported that they had access 
to pool of skilled labourers with experience in manufacturing. If the firm was in a position to expand, 
they were confident that they could easily draw on this pool to meet their needs.  
 
The main issue for every firm interviewed was finding skilled labour.  Qualified artisans, tool and die 
makers, engineers and managerial/administrative skills were particularly identified as in very short 
supply. Each firm reiterated that there was effectively no local supply of skilled artisans. If firms 
required an artisan they are forced to look for qualified individuals nationally, or even internationally, 
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and then try to “woo” them to relocate to PE or EL. This was very hard to do—“People won’t come 
and live here.” 
 
The alternative was for the firms to train their own artisans in-house. However, by training artisans in-
house, the firms risk (a) losing that investment to another firm (most often to the auto sector where 
wages are considerably higher) or another city; or (b) not getting the training approved, recognised or 
reimbursed by the SETA. Most firms do get their levy back from the SETA, but they are not fully 
reimbursed for apprenticeships or learnerships. Firms claimed that reimbursements ranged from 10% 
to 50% of total spend. 
 
Firms interviewed generally belong to one of three SETAs – MerSETA (Manufacturing, Engineering, 
and Related Services); FoodbevSETA (Food and Beverage) and Fp&mSETA (Fibre Processing and 
Manufacturing). Firm feedback on each of the SETAs is summarised in Box 2. 
Box 2: Interviewee Perception of the SETAS 
 
 MerSETA: Unanimously regarded as completely inadequate. Described as: “it doesn’t work at all,” 
“horrendous,” “absolutely useless,” “too much of a cumbersome process.” 
 
FoodBevSETA: Regarded as “very good.”  
 
Fp&mSETA: Regarded as inefficient, very slow, with too much administrative red tape for no 
results.  
 
4.3.5 Lack of government support 
 
Table 27 summarises the EC’s extensive participation in ten Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
grant programmes. The EC is ranked as the number one recipient in six out of the ten programmes. 
This statistic is impressive, illustrating that, when government support is offered, the EC, as a 
province, makes a considerable effort to take advantage of the opportunities at hand. The EC’s current 
participation in government support programmes bodes well for the prospective success of future 
grant programmes in the region.  
 
Table 27: EC access to 10 DTI grant programmes 
SUPPORT PROGRAMMES AMOUNTS AND APPROVALS RELATIVE POSITION OF EC 
Black supplier development 
programme 
R40.6million. 114 approvals 4th position 
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Co-operative incentive scheme R20.8 million, 79 approvals 1st. position 
Incubator support programme R64.3 million. 4 incubators 1st position in amount approved 
Manufacturing Competitiveness 
Enhancement Programme 
R70.6 million. 17 approvals 4th position 
Export Marketing and Investment 
Assistance 
R2million. 5th position 
Manufacturing Investment 
Programme (provincial) 
R571million. 176 projects+ 1st position 
Manufacturing Investment 
Programme (national) 
2enterprises. 12 approvals 1st position in investment 
approvals 
Business Process Outsourcing No approvals  
Tourism support programme 25 projects approved 1st position 
Critical Infrastructure Programme No data available  
Automotive Investment Scheme R221million. 11 projects 2nd position 
Source: Data supplied by ECSECC 
 
 
A number of firms were particularly enthusiastic about the Manufacturing Competitiveness 
Enhancement Programme (MCEP) and the way in which the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) had administered the programme. “It has made a difference.” “Very successful.” “The IDC is 
very good.” All of the firms who took advantage of MCEP held the IDC in very high regard.  
 
However, several firms did take issue with the fact that firms had to be expanding in order to take 
advantage of the programme and this applies to most of the DTI supports. Only 6 of the 25 firms 
interviewed are planning to expand in the near to medium term. 
 
With respect specifically to employment, the firms interviewed were not enthusiastic about the 
proposed Youth Wage Subsidy. The vast majority of firms are not hiring. As a result, a hiring subsidy 
provides no support and is clearly not relevant to firms who are not hiring.  Firms also saw the 
subsidy as a once-off, and were concerned that, once the subsidy ended, they would not be in a 
position to afford to retain workers hired. 
  
The EC provincial government operates a Jobs Stimulus Fund whereby manufacturers can receive up 
to R10,000 for each new employee hired. Only a few firms found this helpful. Again, by far the 
largest number of firms interviewed explained that they made no use of the fund because they were 
not expanding, and thus not hiring any more labourers. The provincial Jobs Stimulus Fund has had 
only a limited effect on only a few firms, confined to those that are expanding output.  
	   71	  
 
4.3.6 Institutional Constraints 
 
Many firm interviews raised concerns about the lack of institutional capacity and performance in the 
EC. Interviews with representatives from DEDEAT, ECSECC, ELIDZ, and the office of MEC Jonas 
provided valuable insight into the limitations that face the multiple government entities currently 
operating within the realm of industrial development in the EC.  
 
Each interviewee reiterated the fact that problems related to institutional performance in the EC were 
not a result of lack of political will - provincial leaders were resoundingly characterised as passionate 
and committed to industrial development, particularly in the non-automotive sector. Interviews 
indicated that the most prominent issues facing the current institutional landscape can be summarised 
as follows:  
 
• Lack of a clear provincial industrial policy that dictates specific roles, deliverable 
objectives, and formalised implementation mechanisms for each of the operating 
development entities. This was especially apparent within the DEDEAT office, which has 
been relying on an ad hoc bottom-up approach, dealing directly with firms or informal 
clusters in order to address sector-specific constraints. In the absence of a clear institutional 
mandate or structure for cluster development, DEDEAT’s involvement is limited to providing 
insight into firm requirements and demands and addressing those demands, where possible, 
on a firm-by-firm basis. Without an institutionalised structure for an ongoing dialogue with 
firms, defining “action plans” or “strategies” for policy implementation is limited to informal, 
atomised, and firm specific interventions.  
 
For example, a “rapid response team” was created within DEDEAT to aid distressed firms 
during the recession. The team was able to assist a number of firms on a case-by-case basis, 
but lacked the institutional foundation - no business plan, no predetermined qualifications for 
“distressed” companies - to continue effective operation following the emergency period. The 
“team” could have evolved into a useful mechanism for meaningful action if it had been 
formally institutionalised within the DEDEAT structure.  
 
• Lack of a clear institutional alignment between different development entities. The 
ELIDZ, Coega IDZ, and the Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) are separate 
agencies that operate under the umbrella of DEDEAT. Eighty percent of the DEDEAT budget 
is transferred to its entities (including, but not limited to the aforementioned entities), while 
the remaining 20% is divided within DEDEAT for various overhead costs and projects. The 
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agencies maintain an informal relationship with DEDEAT by informing the department of 
their activities - meetings ranged from “once a month” (ECDC) to “not that often” 
(ELIDZ/Coega IDZ).  However, there are no expected deliverables stipulated by DEDEAT 
for these agencies. Moreover DEADEAT has no explicit power over how these agencies 
function - the agencies are required only to report internally within their own organisation.  
DEDEAT and its agencies have a working relationship with ECSECC—a separate entity 
under the Office of the Premier—that is maintained on the basis of service level agreements 
for specific projects.   
 
The resulting web of relationships is undefined and informally maintained, with no clear 
power structure or hierarchy.  This has made it difficult for DEDEAT to (1) specify the 
activities of each agency and locate them within a common industrial policy framework; (2) 
coordinate each agency’s activities towards common goals; (3) limit redundancies and 
duplication of effort; and (4) monitor and evaluate each agency on their ability to deliver set 
objectives.  
 
• Lack of capacity. Within DEDEAT’s Trade and Industry Development department there are 
two sector desks for renewable energy and for manufacturing, with plans to employ an agro-
processing specialist and automotive sector specialist. The manufacturing specialist is 
technically supported by both IDZs as well as the ECDC. Within ECSECC, there are five 
positions dedicated to economic development, two of which are dedicated to industrial 
development, ranging from automotive to agro-processing. Neither organisation has the 
personnel to achieve focused desk operations aimed at specific sectors. In the case of 
DEDEAT, positions have been designated, but filling these posts has proved difficult. The 
result, in both ECSECC and DEDEAT, is one or two people responsible for each project that 
falls within the realm of “industry,” “manufacturing,” or “economic development.” 
 
4.4 Interviewee Proposals for Policy and Support 
 
Firms and key informants were asked to give their opinion on possible solutions to ease the 
constraints detailed in the previous sections. The suggestions ranged from very broad to very specific, 
but there was a high degree of consensus amongst the firms and informants in both PE and EL. The 
specific policy suggestions are mainly drawn from interviews with members of the BIEA (Border 
Industrial Employers Association), the CEO of the ELIDZ, and ECSECC. Their suggestions are 
organised below by the specific constraint being addressed. 
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4.4.1 Labour  
 
Across the board, firms subject to centrally bargained wages were very unhappy with the current 
system of wage rate negotiations. The most vocal firms were those subject to the MEIBC rates. The 
BIEA, an association whose membership predominantly consists of MEIBC firms, presented their 
complaints about the current system and possible solutions at a meeting in a meeting with the 
association in September. Their proposals can be summarised as follows: 
 
• A new employee wage rate at 60% of national rates for at least 10 years as a way of averaging 
down the wage bill. The new rate would mean a basic new entry rate and would apply to only 
companies that choose to implement it without applying for exemption through the MEIBC. 
 
• Current employees would receive wage increases in the future that are 2% less than national 
for at least 5 years. 
 
• Wage increases to be given on MEIBC rates not actual to prevent the wage gap for those 
earning more than minimum wage from widening.  
 
• There should be a normal 44-hour workweek before any overtime is paid. This would be in 
line with the motor industry’s 44-hour workweek. Currently, the non-auto manufacturing 
workweek is 40 hours.  
 
• Public holidays should be moved to a Monday or Friday to prevent factories from stopping 
and starting twice a week.  
 
• Worker flexibility should be addressed with the right to fire. To counter the right to fire, the 
BIEA proposes a minimum pay out to workers of 4 month’s pay or a week per completed 
year of service.  
 
The BIEA noted during the discussion that they are in favour of centralised bargaining. Many of the 
firms, not just in the BIEA, mentioned that it was often a relief that they did not have to deal with 
wage negotiations on a plant level and centralised bargaining made their lives easier. However, the 
BIEA supported centralised bargaining within the confines of similar industries and similar regions. 
They requested the MEIBC system be addressed and overhauled to allow for representation of small 
and medium firms. They were unanimously of the opinion that the current system caters to a few very 
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large and very powerful firms, with little acknowledgement of the needs of small and medium firms. 
They specifically requested the following changes to be made to the MEIBC: 
 
• The council should be split into two councils - (1) primary steel producers and their 
distributors and (2) general manufacturing and plastics. These councils should then be 
localised and wages should be bargained on a regional basis. 
 
• Formerly decentralised areas like Dimbaza and Butterworth should be de-linked from national 
collective bargaining. Wages should be based on rural textiles worker wage rates and labour 
law significantly reduced. Local communities should be asked to vote on the acceptance of 
such a system.  
 
In addition to the suggestions received from the BIEA, the 3 clothing and textile firms interviewed in 
EL proposed that EL and its surrounding regions be reclassified as a non-metro region in order to 
lower their wage rates. Their argument was on the basis of lower costs of living in EL as opposed to 
Cape Town or Gauteng.  
 
4.4.2 Electricity  
 
All of the firms unanimously agreed that the rate of electricity cost increases needs to be addressed in 
some form or another. The firms in both EL and PE agreed that the rate of increase on municipality 
mark-ups for the two metros should be less than the national rate of increase in order to start scaling 
down electricity costs. Many of the firms in the formerly industrialised areas around EL suggested 
that Eskom provide a “special power rate” to the Border region.  
 
The BIEA suggested that electricity costs and labour costs should count for a double tax deduction in 
order to bring down the rate of taxation on non-automotive manufacturers in the EC and ease the 
burden of increasing electricity and labour costs. The association hoped that the tax relief would 
promote employment and “bums in seats” manufacturing instead of the increasingly mechanised 
production processes that companies are resorting to in order to cut costs and improve efficiency. The 
BIEA proposed that this deduction would be capped at R15 million for labour costs and R5 million 
for electricity costs per company per annum. They stressed that capping the deduction is very 
important to avoid abuses from large companies and to ensure that the subsidy is sustainable for 
government.  
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4.4.3 Transport  
 
Most firms, especially in the EL area, requested a subsidy on transport costs. The BIEA specifically 
suggested the following subsidy scheme to apply to the EL area: 
 
• Local government should introduce a VAT and tax free transport subsidy to non-automotive 
industry that is based on scheduled labour, which is easily verifiable through pension returns. 
The hope is that this subsidy will also have the indirect impact of encouraging employment 
expansion.  
• This subsidy should be 30% of scheduled labour costs for non-auto manufacturers. 50% of the 
transport subsidy should be required to be reinvested into plant or equipment or business 
expansion in order to encourage sustained investment.  
• The subsidy should be capped at R3.5 million per company to avoid companies taking 
advantage of the subsidy and making sure that it is sustainable for government to maintain.  
 
The firms, as well as the CEO of the EL IDZ and the CEOs of both Chambers of Business, agreed that 
there should be a cheap, efficient, and timely train line from Johannesburg to PE and EL.  
 
In terms of the EL port, there was some disagreement about solutions to the limitations of the port. 
Few firms supported the idea of expanding the port in order to accommodate deep-sea vessels. Most 
interviewees saw this project proposal as a “white elephant” that was not within the realm of 
possibility for the port. Representatives from ECSECC as well as the Border-Kei Chamber of 
Business agreed that the EL port should at least become a viable feeder port and expand its feeder 
vessel operations in order to decrease the reliance on road transport, Both parties claimed that the 
volume of goods coming in and out of the port were high enough to support the operation of an 





4.4.4 Incentivizing Exports 
 
The main exporting firms, as well as the firms whose share of exports has been steadily declining over 
the past 10-15 years, agreed that government should give non-automotive firms more incentives to 
export. They proposed a rebate on goods exported. The BIEA suggested that exports outside of the 
African customs union should be tax free, but that this exemption should only apply to specific areas 
and non-automotive sectors.  
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The topic of export incentives was especially relevant to the firms operating in the IDZs. The CEO of 
the ELIDZ reiterated the fact that the IDZ needs to be made “special” in some respect with incentives 
to attract exporting firms; however, he did not advance any specific proposals in that regard.  
 
With respect to the IDZ, both ECSECC and the CEO of the ELIDZ proposed integrating existing 
industrial estates and formally decentralised areas into the IDZ to form a new Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) with micro-sites in Butterworth, Dimbaza, and Mthatha. Their view was that any incentives or 
exemptions that would be applied to the IDZ in the future should be applied to these depressed areas 
as well.  
 
While the firms interviewed were concerned with promoting exports and attracting export-oriented 
firms to locate in the EC, they also asked that equal emphasis be placed on both retaining existing 
firms and attracting new firms. They were concerned that too much emphasis has been placed on 
enticing new investment to the area with not enough focus on retaining the businesses that have been 
in the area for decades and are struggling to survive.  
 
4.4.5 Addressing the Lack of Demand 
 
In order to address the lack of demand, an issue that was heightened in the wake of the global 
recession, many of the firms interviewed, both CEOs of the Chambers of Business, and ECSECC 
were very supportive of a formalised provincial procurement policy that would guarantee a steady 
stream of demand for local firms. 
 
Currently, the provincial government’s procurement policy is limited to the “Proudly SA Campaign” 
(a national programme) and the “Buy Eastern Cape” policy promoted by ECSECC. Both of these 
programmes offer vague guidelines with no real “teeth.” Some interviewees proposed they should be 
revised to include enforceable targets for procurement from firms within the region. A number of 
firms indicated that a provincial and local government procurement policy that gave preference to 
local manufacturers would help guarantee their firms a minimum level demand and help counteract 
the effects of the global recession.  
 
Although there was enthusiasm for a revised procurement strategy, the firms (especially those 
represented by BIEA) and the key informants noted that, while this policy would be helpful at 
sustaining levels of demand, it should not be used as a crutch. The EC should work towards a 
competitive and sustainable manufacturing base that does not rely solely on supplying government. 
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4.4.6 Skills, Research & Development, and General Support 
 
Specific suggestions regarding skills development from the firms were limited. There was a consensus 
that the SETAs (especially the MerSETA) need to be run more efficiently. There needs to be greater 
reimbursement for in-house training programmes, less administrative red tape, and faster response 
times from the SETAs. The firms were also adamant that more artisan training centres needed to be 
established in the EC.  
 
In terms of government support for Research and Development initiatives, many firms asked for more 
incentives to innovate.  A number of firms noted that the tool-making sector in the EC is 
uncompetitive and dying and this would have an adverse impact on manufacturing in the region. 
Some firms argued that incentives should be introduced for product development and tool making. 
Representatives from ECSECC suggested that the EC should make better use of its universities, 
especially Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). More investment should be made in 
science and research at NMMU and there should be a stronger linked established between the 
university and provincial industry.  
 
ECSECC also proposed the establishment of a better communication network regarding government 
support measures that are available to firms in the non-automotive industry. A full-time position 
should be established (either within ECSECC or another regional organisation) to provide assistance 
to firms applying for government incentives, aid in the SETA administrative processes, and lobby on 
behalf of the non-automotive sector’s interests to higher levels of government. When this idea was 
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The issues plaguing EC are in many ways a reflection of the issues plaguing South Africa writ small. 
South Africa is currently faced with high levels of poverty and unemployment, paired with low levels 
of labour force participation. National policies are needed to address these national issues. Public 
sector participation in the creation and implementation of policy solutions to support the 
diversification and upgrading of manufacturing activities is an essential step in reversing these trends 
(Rodrik 2006).  
 
The EC economy reflects national patterns of stagnate industrialisation and increasing capital 
intensification, however; the preceding chapters demonstrate that the province also suffers from 
constraints that are specific to the region in both substance and scale. These constraints are 
manifestations of the region’s unique historical, geographical, and socio-political context and can only 
by adequately addressed through policies tailored to this environment.  
 
While the EC automotive subsector has benefited from the government support, NAM firms—
especially those involved in low skill, labour intensive activities—have failed to grow in the absence 
of the generous apartheid-era incentives that drew them to the region in the first place. The EC’s lack 
of industrial diversification, resulting in a continued reliance on the automotive sector to bolster 
manufacturing output and employment, is an issue that requires public intervention.  
 
This thesis set out to engage in a dialogue with representatives from both the private and public sector 
in order to identify the specific constraints limiting the growth of non-automotive firms in the EC. The 
following section will briefly summarise the constraints identified by the study and will offer selective 
policy suggestions, taking into account interviewee proposals, as well as the current institutional 
limitations of the EC provincial government.  
 
5.2 Policy Recommendations  
 
In light of the Provincial Industrial Development Strategy (PIDS) revision in 2015, this section will 
provide suggestions for new policies to address constraints specific to the NAM sectors of the EC. 
This section does not address all of the constraints analysed in the previous chapter. Instead, it focuses 
on the most crucial areas necessary for NAM development. Given the limited institutional capacity of 
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the EC provincial government, it is necessary to prioritise issues and interventions, rather than present 
an impractical “wish list” of policy interventions that have no hope of being realised.   
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that many of the constraints can only be addressed through 
national channels of policymaking and implementation. While provincial industrial policy cannot play 
a significant role in alleviating these constraints, it is still necessary to draw attention to issues unique 
to the EC in the hope that national government may provide regional policy solutions to these regional 
problems.   
 
5.2.1 Wage and Labour Market Disadvantages 
The Constraint Problem Summarised 
 
Central bargaining systems (with a special emphasis on the MEIBC) determine wage levels and 
labour market regulations with no regard for the locational disadvantages (i.e. input and output 
transport costs) faced by firms located outside the main industrial nodes. The wage levels in the 
primary industrial areas—Gauteng, Cape Town, and Durban—are the same as those in PE and EL. 
This prevents firms in PE and EL from capitalising on a differentiated wage rate that could potentially 
provide the region with a comparative advantage relative to firms situated in more optimal locations.  
 
Furthermore, these national bargaining councils are dominated by a few large firms, providing little-
to-no room for small and medium sized firms to influence the decision-making process. These firms 
are then required to adhere to wage levels generally applied without consideration for the unique 
needs of firms operating within a variety of subsectors, locations, infrastructural conditions, 
production scales and levels of competition.  
 
Under these conditions, EC manufacturing, with a large pool of unemployed, experienced labourers—
one of the province’s most significant assets—is shedding labour and increasing capital intensity at a 
faster than the national aggregate.  
Policy Recommendation 
 
This issue lies outside the control of the EC provincial government. Transforming the way South 
Africa deals with issues of labour legislation and wage bargaining institutions is a problem that 
extends outside of the scope of this thesis. Ideally, the central bargaining system could be 
reconstructed to account for differences in location, subsector, and firm size. Instead of a blanket 
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application of a wage rate determined by a select few, the system could allow for greater 
representation of small and medium enterprises from a variety of locales.  
 
5.2.2 Skills and Training 
The Constraint Problem Summarised 
 
The EC has a large supply of unemployed labour that has previous experience working in 
manufacturing—finding unskilled or semi-skilled labour is not the crux of the issue. The main 
problem is the shortage of skilled labour—artisans, engineers, administrators, etc. While this issue is 
definitely considered a national problem, its effects are more severe in the EC due to: 
(a) Salary limitations: Firms in Cape Town, Gauteng, and, significantly, the EC 
automotive sector, are better capitalised and able to pay more to attract skilled 
labourers away from positions in NAM firms.  
(b) SETA performance: As detailed in Box 2, firm experiences in dealing with the SETAs 
were generally extremely negative—a lot of red tape with very little results. Lack of 




The only response to a lack of skills is to create more skills. Unfortunately, there is no quick fix—this 
is a long-term goal that requires long-term policy solutions. Similar to the issue of centrally bargained 
wage levels, SETA inadequacy is a national problem. The current SETA system needs to be evaluated 
and restructured in order to better meet the needs of small-to-medium size firms. There is evidence of 
SETAs that work efficiently (the FoodBevSETA was highly regarded). These SETAs should be 
studied in order identify the factors that contribute to their success with the hope that this information 
can then be used to the benefit of the SETA system as whole.  
 
In the interim, provincial government can engage with the SETAs that operate within the EC. A 
survey should be completed by ECSECC, which focuses solely on firm opinions and interactions with 
the SETAs. The results of this survey should be presented to the local SETA offices in order to initiate 
a flow of information. Additionally, provincial government should establish a forum to provide a 
medium for SETA-firm interaction with the ultimate goal of creating innovative solutions to skill and 
training problems unique to the EC.  
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5.2.3 Electricity Costs 
The Constraint Problem Summarised 
 
Escalating electricity charges over the past five years has placed a burden on South African industry 
as whole. However, the EC municipality mark-ups are amongst the highest in the country (as 
documented in Section 4.3.1), adding an extra strain on NAM firms that are heavy energy users. The 
escalation of municipality mark-ups is rooted in (a) the monopoly that municipalities have over 
electricity distribution; (b) the two municipalities using the mark-up as means to subsidize other 
operations; (c) inefficiency caused by the badly maintained electricity distribution infrastructure.  
 
Policy Recommendation 
Decreasing the municipality mark-up would require a massive investment in upgrading the electricity 
distribution infrastructure of the two municipalities in order to increase energy efficiency and cut 
costs. This is a long-term goal and requires capacities and funding that the local governments simply 
don’t have.   
 
An alternative solution is to create a regional policy initiative within the EC to support collective 
participation of industries in advancing renewable energy solutions As a primary goal, the EC 
provincial government should create and implement a regional policy to provide support for collective 
initiatives aimed at installing wind and solar energy farms within established industrial areas (e.g. 
Wilsonia, Coega IDZ, ELIDZ, Uitenhage, etc). The cost and risk of installing a alternative energy 
source are too great for a single firm to bear. Public sector involvement is necessary to coordinate the 
investment and expertise necessary to make such a policy a reality. Such a policy, if implemented 
correctly, would go a long way in reducing energy costs in concentrated industrial areas.  
 
5.2.4 Transport and Logistics 
The Constraint Problem Summarised 
 
One of the major location disadvantages of being located in the EC is the fact that manufacturing 
firms have to transport most, if not all, of their inputs into the province and then incur that cost again 
when they transport their outputs to major distribution centres located in Gauteng, Cape Town, and 
Durban. Due to the inefficiencies and unreliability of rail transport, the vast majority of input/output 
transport is done by road. This cost is considerably more for firms located in EL. Without a deep-sea 
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port, EL firms are forced to use either (a) a feeder vessel that operates once a week from the PE port; 
or (b) truck their materials to and from ports in Durban and PE (most firms utilise the latter mode).  
Policy Recommendation 
 
The only viable solution to this problem is to tackle the issue of the South African railway system. 
This is already a key item on the national government’s agenda. In order for national railway 
upgrading to positively impact the EC, priority needs to be given to upgrading existing rail links from 
PE and EL to the industrial nodes of Gauteng, Durban and Cape Town. Future upgrading should also 
be considered for the link connected PE to EL via Queenstown. This is issue is especially significant 
for the future growth of the IDZs—both in Coega and EL—and would enhance their ability to attract 
new investments and industries to the region.  
 
5.2.5 Lack of Demand  
The Constraint Problem Summarised 
 
Though not one of the original constraints posed to the interviewees in the questionnaire, the lack of 
demand came up repeatedly in interviews as a major constraint to firm growth. Lack of demand 
largely emanates from the uncompetitive cost structure of products—a reflection of the location 
disadvantages of producing in the EC (i.e. added transport costs, electricity costs). For many firms, 
comparative advantage lies in the proximity to the local market; however, the EC regional market is 
currently too small to sustain output growth.  
Policy Recommendation 
 
In order to boost demand from the region, this thesis recommends the implementation of a regional 
public procurement policy. Currently, the provincial government has established a “Buy Eastern 
Cape” campaign, which aims at promoting government procurement of local goods and services. 
However, this policy currently has no real enforcement measures and is still in the early stages of 
implementation. In order to transform this campaign into a catalyst for economic growth and job 
creation in small-to-medium local businesses, the policy needs to be supplemented by the following: 
• Incorporation in to the larger EC industrial policy framework, paired with the establishment 
of a regulating agency that is trained to ensure that the process is fair and transparent. 
• The adoption of a tendering mechanism, that gives preference to local firms, but does not 
necessarily exclude firms from other provinces. 
• The creation of a database of all local firms that meet tendering requirements in order to 
maximise the efficiency of the tendering process. 
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5.2.7 Institutional Constraints 
The Constraint Problem Summarised 
 
The EC has a variety of agencies involved in the industrial development of the province.  Interviewees 
described leadership within the province as “committed” and “passionate”—the institutional 
constraints are not a result of a paucity of political will. Rather, the agencies operating into the EC 
suffer from a lack of:  
1. A clear industrial policy that dictates specific roles and deliverables for the separate agencies, 
as well as outlines their relationship to one another within a clear industrial policy framework; 
2. A clear industrial policy that allows for the institutionalisation of clusters and ad hoc 
programmes.  In the absence of such a framework, DEDEAT is left to rely on “bottom up” 
tactics to provide support to distressed firms and sectors through informal cluster and firm-
based interaction; 
3. Capacity within the operating agencies to allow for focused, sector-based desk operations.  
Policy Recommendation 
 
Revisions to the PIDS in 2015 to should encompass all government agencies currently involved in EC 
industrial development, clearly outlining: 
(a) Each organisation’s role and objectives in both the short term and the long term; 
(b) The alignment of these objectives within the province’s larger industrial policy aims;  
(c) A clear hierarchy of command and inter-agency relationships in order to enable proper 
monitoring and evaluation of each agency’s activities;  
(d) A formalised process for the institutionalisation of sector clusters within the broader 
policy framework; and 
(e) A strategy to urgently address the need to enhance and expand institutional capacity 
within DEDEAT. 
 
With respect to the lack of capacity, this is a constraint felt on national scale and requires a national 
response in the form of increased access to education and training for the public sector. However, this 
is a long-term solution. In the short-term, the only way to build capacity and skills in the province is 
by engaging in the process of “learning by doing.” The EC development agencies must continue to 
move forward in the implementation of policies, even if those policies fail. Institution building is a 
learning process.  
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5.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
When faced with the magnitude of the current economic issues facing the EC, the prospect of finding 
policy solutions may seem daunting. However, if one focuses on getting the process right, the 
pressure to find immediate successes recedes, and the task becomes more surmountable. The process 
of good policymaking requires a meaningful dialogue between the private and public sector to 
identify present constraints and new opportunities. Both the public and private sectors are required for 
economic transformation. Cultivating this relationship is the first step towards getting the process 
right.  
 
The Provincial Industrial Development Strategy (PIDS) is scheduled for revision in 2015. This 
presents an amazing opportunity for the EC government to create meaningful policy that addresses the 
province’s current crisis—a crisis rooted in stagnant manufacturing output, little diversification of 
industrial activity, and rapidly declining employment and labour force participation levels.  
 
The new policy strategy, rather than simply reflecting national aims and directives, should focus on 
developing specific and targeted solutions that reflect the current needs of the province. Within this 
new strategy, the decline of NAM industries must be adequately addressed; both in terms of 
supporting struggling established firms and attracting new entrants. By working to alleviate the 
constraints outlined in this thesis, the EC government can make significant steps towards unlocking 
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Appendix A 
QLFS	  Employment	  Data:	  Yearly	  Average	  Employment	  by	  Sector	  	  




 OHS Average of 2 LFS Samples per year 
Average of quarterly LFS 
surveys 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 
Food, beverages, 
tobacco products 269167 296495 311175 290311 305944 265935 302798 322697 345457 
Textiles, clothing, 
leather goods 278914 312474 358561 358182 325925 302191 286639 252269 251828 
Wood/wood products 152045 166715 179812 171671 181673 223258 251556 233823 189070 
Fuel, petroleum, 
chemical rubber 202734 166963 166323 198982 197264 186986 249686 204469 219792 
Other non-metallic 
mineral products 69200 104288 96219 110151 115239 117520 128907 1101434 106808 
Metal products, 
machinery & 
household appliances 235725 285444 323461 356090 338992 421310 487731 387708 417022 
Electrical machinery 
& apparatus 48468 31825 38055 37577 46215 39578 31929 20171 24267 
Electronic, sound 
vision, medical  24343 10362 13584 22620 14152 29313 39731 24798 18963 
Transport equipment 104366 80783 92830 108567 105936 143402 161243 131302 152026 
Furniture and other  107515 52505 71629 96899 119637 115290 122118 108323 84636 




 OHS Average of 2 LFS Samples per year 
Average of quarterly LFS 
surveys 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 
Food, beverages, 
tobacco products 19056 17981 25939 23147 25696 14284 37155 25941 33365 
Textiles, clothing,  
leather goods 29592 16379 26434 33299 30853 32014 26644 21462 17290 
Wood/wood products 10107 4777 9513 8309 10493 16820 18558 19259 20980 
Fuel, petroleum, 
chemical rubber  19036 12454 8370 17415 15532 17045 25698 21405 16369 
Other non-metallic 
mineral products 8260 5477 7568 11796 14202 9963 13432 9131 9556 
Metal products, 
machinery,  
household appliances 20498 10750 10074 10104 13194 31178 19635 14194 22009 
Electrical machinery 
& apparatus 9580 3155 2551 5289 4533 3981 3493 3592 3208 
Electronic, sound 
vision, medical  2723 1040 1804 631 869 1312 1411 1664  
Transport equipment 27487 16988 21305 26215 24374 31603 41666 33689 56212 
Furniture and other  26712 753 5550 2691 7010 8143 11573 5349 6261 
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We are seeking to know the following: 
1. What are the factors that are currently (a) facilitating and (b) constraining firm growth? 
2. What are the factors that are currently (a) encouraging and (b) discouraging firms from taking 
on more workers? 
 
TYPE OF FIRM 
Firm Location 
Where is the firm located? 
Firm Size 
How many employees? How has this changed over the last 10 years? Roughly speaking what 
percentage of your workers are below 25 and over 50? 
What is the firm’s turnover? 
Firm Sector 
What is the firm’s principal product? TOP 3 PRODUCTS. What markets are you feeding into? 
What is the firm’s ISIC (or other sector designation) 
Firm Age 
When was the firm first established? 
Exports 
What percentage of the firm’s output is exported? 
Ownership 
What is the form of ownership – private/public? 
Is the firm part of a larger group? 
Is the firm owned in whole or in part outside of SA? 
OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH/CONTRACTION 
1. Has the firm expanded/contracted over the last 5 years – turnover growth/contraction. (% will 
do). Over the last 10 years? 
2. How has investment expanded or contracted over the last 5 years? Over the last 10 years? 
3. How has employment expanded or contracted over the last 5 years. Over the last 10 years? 
Has your profile of unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled labour changed over the last 10 years? 
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1. Do you fall under a bargaining council? Which one?  
2. Are your labour costs (e.g. wages) determined nationally or regionally? 
3. Is there a possibility in the bargaining wage council of a dispensation to decrease labour costs 
due to firm size/location? In practice does this actually happen?  
4. What are your labour costs as compared to say Gauteng? Is there an overall differential? And 
what is the differential for different categories of workers (unskilled; semiskilled; technical; 
professional)?  
5. Has the wage altered dramatically over the last 5 and 10 years for the different categories of 
labour? 
 
Skills and productivity 
1. Can you obtain the skills that you require? How long does it take you fill a vacancy for skilled 
worker/ a technician/ a professional (e.g. manager)? Do you need to train or retrain the 
workers that you have recruited?  
2. Has the situation improved or gotten worse – 5 and 10 years? 
3. What share of turnover do you invest in training? How has that changed over time?  Is this on 
the job training or off the job training? Can you differentiate between on the job and off the 
job training?  
4. Do you utitlise the SETA? Does it function well in supporting your training efforts 
5. How great is the differential between what you invest in training and what you receive back 
from the SETA? How adequate are the training institutions?  
Turnover 
1. What are your turnover rates for labour – different categories [production, administrative, 
technical]? 
2. How has this changed over time – 5 and 10 years? 
3. What are your absenteeism rates? 
 
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORT 
1. Are the utilities adequate? Expand if there is a problem. Do you experience significant 
breakdowns?  
2. Do you think that your utility/transport costs disadvantage you compared to other 
competitions in different regions?  
3. What percentage of your costs relate to transport – road, rail and ports? How has this changed 
over time?  
4. What percentage of your costs relate to electricity – how has this changed over time? 
5. What percentage of your costs relate to local government services – water, rates and taxes? 
How has this changed over time? 
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COMPETITION 
1. Where are your main competitors located?  
2. Who are the dominant players in your market and where are they located? 
3. Has your market become more concentrated in the last 5 and 10 years? 
4. What advantages do your competitors located elsewhere in SA have over you? 
5. Do you have any advantages in your present location?  [Relate this question to Butterworth, 
Dimbaza, King William’s Town] 
 
IMPORTS/EXPORTS 
1. What share of your products are exported? Where do you export to? How has this changed in 
5 and 10 years? 
2. Where do you source your inputs? [locally, nationally, foreign] 
 
SUPPORT SERVICES 
1. Are you able to get the support services that you need locally e.g. repair and maintenance? 
How has the situation changed over the last 5 and 10 years? 
 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND SUPPORTS 
1. What government supports do you access – investment subsidy; sectoral support programmes; 
IDC; R&D? Do you get support from Metro? Regional? National?  
2. Of those that you access, which are the most important?  
3. What does the IDZ do for you? Do you think that it could do more for you?    
4. Do you belong to any clusters/ INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS? If so, what are the major 
advantages? 
5. Do you know any firms that belong to any other clusters (e.g. EC Benchmarking Club, the 
Auto Cluster) and has that given them any perceived advantage? 
6. Do local or regional government officials visit/engage with you on industry issues? Do they 
have dedicated desks to engage with firms? Do they have priority sectors to provide support 
to? 
7. Are their sector forums where gov officials interact with firms/sectors to tackle industry 
problems and challenges? 
 
ORDERING THE KEY CONSTRAINTS ON GROWTH 
On a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 10 (important), what are the factors that currently constrain growth 
High labour costs       
Low productivity     
Shortages of skills      
Transport Costs 
Electricity Costs 
Local competition    
Competition from Imports   
Lack of support from government 
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KEY POLICY MEASURES 
If you had to select the most important thing that you would like government to do that would 
enhance your growth (not prohibit imports) what would that be? 
If you had to select one thing that you would like government to do that would lead you to hire more 
labour what would that be? 
In the event that labour costs were reduced by 20%, would that lead you to grow more? and hire more 
labour? Is it possible to give an estimate (e.g. how many workers)? 
In the event that you were able to layoff workers at will, would that change your approach to hiring 
more workers?  
If the government implemented a youth wage subsidy, would you employ more young workers? 
If there was a subsidy to hiring young first time entrants so that you only paid 50% of their salary how 
many additional workers would you hire? 
Are you aware of regional/local government procurement policies? If you had a local procurement 
policy in Buffalo City what impact would that have on your output/hiring prospects?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
